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ABSTRACT
Economists have long recognized that investors care differently about downside losses versus upside
gains. Agents who place greater weight on downside risk demand additional compensation for
holding stocks with high sensitivities to downside market movements. We show that the cross-
section of stock returns reflects a premium for downside risk. Specifically, stocks that covary
strongly with the market when the market declines have high average returns. We estimate that the
downside risk premium is approximately 6% per annum. The reward for bearing downside risk is
not simply compensation for regular market beta, nor is it explained by coskewness or liquidity risk,
or size, book-to-market, and momentum characteristics.
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If an asset tends to move downward in a declining market more than it moves upward in a rising
market, it is an unattractive asset to hold because it tends to have very low payoffs precisely
when the wealth of investors is low. Investors who are sensitive to downside losses, relative
to upside gains, require a premium for holding assets that covary strongly with the market
when the market declines. Hence, in an economy with agents placing greater emphasis on
downside risk than upside gains, assets with high sensitivities to downside market movements
have high average returns. In this article, we show that the cross-section of stock returns reﬂects
a premium for bearing downside risk.
As early as Roy (1952), economists have recognized that investors care differently about
downside losses than they care about upside gains. Markowitz (1959) advocates using semi-
variance as a measure of risk, rather than variance, because semi-variance measures downside
losses rather than upside gains. More recently, the behavioral framework of Kahneman and
Tversky’s (1979) loss aversion preferences, and the axiomatic approach taken by Gul’s (1991)
disappointment aversion preferences, allow agents to place greater weights on losses relative to
gains in their utility functions. Hence in equilibrium, agents who are averse to downside losses
demand greater compensation, in the form of higher expected returns, for holding stocks with
high downside risk.
According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), a stock’s expected excess return
is proportional to its market beta, which is constant across periods of high and low market
returns. As Bawa and Lindenberg (1977) suggest, a natural extension of the CAPM that takes
into account the asymmetric treatment of risk is to specify asymmetric downside and upside
betas. We compute downside (upside) betas over periods when the excess market return is
below (above) its mean. We show that stocks with high downside betas have, on average, high
unconditional average returns. We also ﬁnd that stocks with high covariation conditional on
upside movements of the market tend to trade at a discount, but the premium for downside risk
dominates in the cross-section of stock returns.
Despite the intuitive appeal of downside risk, which closely corresponds to how individual
investors actually perceive risk, there has been little empirical research into how downside risk
is priced in the cross-section of stock returns. Early researchers found little evidence of a
downside risk premium because they did not focus on measuring the downside risk premium
using all individual stocks in the cross section. For example, Jahankhani (1976) fails to ﬁnd any
improvement over the traditional CAPM by using downside betas, but his investigation uses
portfolios formed from regular CAPM betas. Similarly, Harlow and Rao (1989) only evaluate
1downside risk relative to the CAPM in a maximum likelihood framework and test whether the
return on the zero-beta asset is the same across all assets. All of these early authors do not
directly estimate a downside risk premium by demonstrating that assets which covary more
when the market declines have higher average returns.1
Our strategy for ﬁnding a premium for bearing downside risk in the cross section is as
follows. First, we directly show at the individual stock level that stocks with higher downside
betas contemporaneously have higher average returns. Second, we claim that downside beta is a
riskattributebecausestocksthathavehighcovariationwiththemarketwhenthemarketdeclines
exhibit high average returns over the same period. This contemporaneous relationship between
factor loadings and risk premia is the foundation of a cross-sectional risk-return relationship,
and has been exploited from the earliest tests of the CAPM (see, among others, Black, Jensen
and Scholes, 1972; Gibbons, 1982). More recently, Fama and French (1992) also seek, but fail
to ﬁnd, a relationship between post-formation market betas from an unconditional CAPM and
realized average stock returns over the same period. Our study differs from these earlier tests by
examining a series of short one-year samples using daily data, rather than a single long sample
using monthly data. This strategy provides with greater statistical power in an environment
where betas may be time-varying (see comments by Ang and Chen, 2004; Lewellen and Nagel,
2004).
Third, we differentiate the reward for holding high downside risk stocks from other known
cross-sectional effects. In particular, Rubinstein (1973), Friend and Westerﬁeld (1980), Kraus
and Litzenberger (1976, 1983), and Harvey and Siddique (2000a) show that agents dislike
stocks with negative coskewness, so that stocks with low coskewness tend to have high
average returns. Downside risk is different from coskewness risk because downside beta
explicitly conditions for market downside movements in a non-linear fashion, whereras the
coskewness statistic does not explicitly emphasize asymmetries across down and up markets,
even in settings where coskewness may vary over time (as in Harvey and Siddique, 1999).
Since coskewness captures some aspects of downside covariation, we are especially careful
to control for coskewness risk in assessing the premium for downside beta. We also control
1 Pettengill, Sundaram and Mathur (1995) and Isakov (1999) estimate the CAPM by splitting the full sample
into two subsamples that consist of observations where the realized excess market return is positive or negative.
Naturally, they estimate a positive (negative) market premium for the subsample with positive (negative) excess
market returns. In contrast, our approach examines premiums for asymmetries in the factor loadings, rather than
estimating factor models on different subsamples. Price, Price and Nantell (1982) demonstrate that skewness in
U.S. equity returns causes downside betas to be different from unconditional betas, but do not relate downside
betas to average stock returns.
2for the standard list of known cross-sectional effects, including size and book-to-market factor
loadings and characteristics (Fama and French, 1993; Daniel and Titman, 1997), liquidity risk
factor loadings (P´ astor and Stambaugh, 2003), and past return characteristics (Jegadeesh and
Titman, 1993). Controlling for these and other cross-sectional effects, we estimate that the
cross-sectional premium is approximately 6% per annum.
Finally, we check if past downside betas predict future expected returns. We ﬁnd that, for
the majority of the cross-section, high past downside beta predicts high future returns over the
next month, similar to the contemporaneous relationship between realized downside beta and
realized average returns. However, this relation breaks down among stocks with very high
volatility. We attribute this to two effects. First, the future downside covariation of very volatile
stocks is difﬁcult to predict using past downside betas – the average one-year autocorrelation of
one-year downside betas for very volatile stocks is only 17.3% compared to 43.5% for a typical
stock. This is not surprising because high volatility increases measurement error. Second,
stocks with very high volatilities exhibit anomalously low returns (see Ang, Hodrick, Xing
and Zhang, 2005). Fortunately, the proportion of the market where past downside beta fails
to predict future returns is small (less than 4% in terms of market capitalization). Conﬁrming
Harvey and Siddique (2000a), we ﬁnd that past coskewness predicts future returns, but the
predictive power of past coskewness is not because past coskewness captures future exposure
to downside risk. Hence, past downside beta and past coskewness are different risk loadings.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple model to
show how a downside risk premium may arise in a cross-sectional equilibrium. The framework
uses a representative agent with the kinked disappointment aversion utility function of Gul
(1991) which places larger weight on downside outcomes. Section 3 demonstrates that stocks
with high downside betas have high average returns over the same period that they strongly
covary with declining market returns. In Section 4, we examine the predictive ability of past
downside risk loadings. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Simple Model of Downside Risk
In this section, we show how downside risk may be priced cross-sectionally in an equilibrium
setting. Speciﬁcally, we work with a rational disappointment aversion (DA) utility function
that embeds downside risk following Gul (1991). Our goal is to provide a simple motivating
example of how a representative agent with a larger aversion to losses, relative to his attraction
3to gains, gives rise to cross-sectional prices that embed compensation for downside risk.2
We emphasize that our simple approach does not rule out other possible ways in which
downside risk may be priced in the cross-section. For example, Shumway (1997) develops an
equilibrium behavioral model based on loss averse investors. Barberis and Huang (2001) use a
loss aversion utility function, combined with mental accounting, to construct a cross-sectional
equilibrium. However, they do not relate expected stock returns to direct measures of downside
risk. Aversion to downside risk also arises in models with constraints that bind only in one
direction, for example, binding short-sales constraints (Chen, Hong and Stein, 2001; Hong and
Stein 2003) or wealth constraints (Kyle and Xiong, 2001).
Rather than considering models with one-sided constraints or agents with behavioral biases,
we treat asymmetries in risk in a rational representative agent framework that abstracts from
additional interactions from one-sided constraints. The advantage of treating asymmetric risk
in a rational framework is that the disappointment utility function is globally concave and
provides solvable portfolio allocation problems, whereas optimal ﬁnite portfolio allocations
for loss aversion utility may not exist (see Ang, Bekaert and Liu, 2005). Our example with
disappointment utility differs from previous studies, because existing work with Gul’s (1991)
ﬁrst order risk aversion utility concentrates on the equilibrium pricing of downside risk for only
the aggregate market, usually in a consumption setting (see, for example, Bekaert, Hodrick
and Marshall, 1997; Epstein and Zin, 1990 and 2001; Routledge and Zin, 2003). While a
full equilibrium analysis of downside risk would entail using consumption data, in our simple
example and in our empirical work, we measure aggregate wealth by the market portfolio,
similar to a CAPM setting.












where U(W) is the felicity function over end-of-period wealth W, which we choose to be
power utility, that is U(W) = W (1¡°)=(1 ¡ °). The parameter 0 < A · 1 is the coefﬁcient
of disappointment aversion, F(¢) is the cumulative distribution function for wealth, ¹W is the
certainty equivalent (the certain level of wealth that generates the same utility as the portfolio
allocation determining W) and K is a scalar given by:
K = Pr(W · ¹W) + APr(W > ¹W): (2)
2 While standard power, or CRRA, utility also produces aversion to downside risk, the order of magnitude of
a downside risk premium, relative to upside potential, is economically negligible because CRRA preferences are
locally mean-variance.
4Outcomes above (below) the certainty equivalent ¹W are termed “elating” (“disappointing”)
outcomes. If 0 < A < 1, then the utility function (1) down-weights elating outcomes relative to
disappointing outcomes. Put another way, the disappointment averse investor cares more about
downside versus upside risk. If A = 1, disappointment utility reduces to the special case of
standard CRRA utility, which is closely approximated by mean-variance utility.
To illustrate the effect of downside risk on the cross-section of stock returns, we work with
two assets x and y. Asset x has three possible payoffs ux, mx and dx, and asset y has two
possible payoffs uy and dy. These payoffs are in excess of the risk-free payoff. Our set-up
has the minimum number of assets and states required to examine cross-sectional pricing (the
expected returns of x and y relative to each other and to the market portfolio, which consists
of x and y), and to incorporate higher moments (through the three states of x). The full set of












where the certainty equivalent is deﬁned in equation (1), wx (wy) is the portfolio weight of asset
x (y), end of period wealth W is given by:
W = Rf + wxx + wyy; (4)
and Rf is the gross risk-free rate. An equilibrium is characterized by a set of asset payoffs,
corresponding probabilities, and a set of portfolio weights so that equation (3) is maximized
and the representative agent holds the market portfolio (wx + wy = 1) with 0 < wx < 1 and
0 < wy < 1.
The equilibrium solution even for this simple case is computationally non-trivial because the
solution to the asset allocation problem (3) entails simultaneously solving for both the certainty
equivalent ¹W and for the portfolio weights wx and wy. In contrast, a standard portfolio
allocation problem for CRRA utility only requires solving the ﬁrst order conditions for the
optimal wx and wy. We extend a solution algorithm for the optimization (3) developed by Ang,
5Bekaert and Liu (2005) to multiple assets. Appendix A describes our solution method and
details the values used in the calibration. Computing the solution is challenging because for
certain parameter values, equilibrium cannot exist because non-participation may be optimal
for low A under DA utility. This is unlike the asset allocation problem under standard CRRA
utility, where agents always optimally hold risky assets that have strictly positive risk premia.
In this simple model, the regular beta with respect to the market portfolio (denoted by ¯ =
cov(ri;rm)=var(rm)) is not a sufﬁcient statistic to describe the risk-return relationship of an
individual stock. In our calibration, an asset’s expected returns increase with ¯, but ¯ does not
fully reﬂect all risk. This is because the representative agent cares in particular about downside
risk, through A < 1. Hence, measures of downside risk have explanatory power for describing
the cross-section of expected returns. One measure of downside risk introduced by Bawa and






where ri (rm) is security i’s (the market’s) excess return, and ¹m is the average market excess
return. We also compute a relative downside beta relative to the regular CAPM beta, which we
denote by ¯¡ ¡ ¯.
Figure 1 shows various risk-return relationships holding in our DA cross-sectional equilib-
rium. In the left ﬁgure of the top row, mean excess returns increase with ¯¡. To make sure that
¯¡ is not merely reﬂecting the regular CAPM beta, we deﬁne the CAPM alpha as the excess
return of an asset not accounted for by the regular CAPM beta, ® = E(ri)¡¯E(rm). The ﬁgure
in the right column in the top row of Figure 1 shows that the CAPM alpha is increasing with ¯¡.
In the second row, we also ﬁnd that CAPM alpha is also increasing with relative downside beta,
(¯¡ ¡ ¯). Hence, higher downside risk is remunerated by higher expected returns not captured
by the CAPM.
The right-hand ﬁgure in the middle row of Figure 1 plots the CAPM alpha versus
coskewness, where coskewness is deﬁned as:
coskew =




where ¹i is the average excess return of asset i. Harvey and Siddique (2000a) predict that lower
coskewness should be associated with higher expected returns. The coskewness measure can








6where W is the total wealth of the representative agent, and U0(¢) can be approximated by:
U








m + ¢¢¢ : (8)
The Taylor expansion in equation (8) is necessarily only an approximation. In particular,
since the DA utility function is kinked, polynomial expansions of U, such as the expansions
used by Bansal, Hsieh and Viswanathan (1993), may not be good global approximations if the
kink is large (or A is very small).3 Nevertheless, measures like coskewness based on the Taylor
approximation for the utility function should also have some explanatory power for returns.
Downside beta and coskewness may potentially capture different effects. Note that for DA
utility, both downside beta and coskewness are approximations because the utility function
does not have an explicit form (equation (1) implicitly deﬁnes DA utility). Since DA utility
is kinked at an endogenous certainty equivalent, skewness, and other centered moments may
not effectively capture aversion to risk across upside and downside movements in all situations.
This is because they are based on unconditional approximations to a non-smooth function. In
contrast, the downside beta in equation (5) conditions directly on a downside event that the
market return is less than its unconditional mean. In Figure 1, our model shows that more
negative coskewness is compensated by higher expected returns. However, the Appendix
describes a case where CAPM alphas may increase as coskewness increases which is the
opposite of the relation predicted by the Taylor expansion.
With DA utility, a representative agent is willing to hold stocks with high upside potential
at a discount, all else being equal. A stock with high upside potential relative to downside risk
tends to pay off more when an investor’s wealth is already high. Such stocks are not as desirable
as stocks that pay off when the market decreases. Consider two stocks with the same downside
beta, but with different payoffs in market up markets. The stock that covaries more with the
market when the market rises has a larger payoff when the market return is high. This stock
does not need as high an expected return in order for the representative agent to hold it. Thus,
there is a discount for stocks with high upside potential. To measure upside risk, we compute an
upside beta (denoted by ¯+) that takes the same form as equation (5), except that we condition







problems by Guidolin and Timmerman (2002), Jondeau and Rockinger (2003), and Harvey, Liechty, Liechty and
M¨ uller (2003).
7Regular beta, downside and upside betas are, by construction, not independent of each
other. To differentiate the effect of upside risk from downside risk, we introduce two additional
measures. Similar to relative downside beta, we compute a relative upside beta (denoted by
¯+ ¡ ¯). We also directly examine the difference between upside beta and downside beta
by computing the difference between the two, (¯+ ¡ ¯¡). In the last row of Figure 1, our
model shows that controlling for regular beta or downside beta, higher upside potential is indeed
remunerated by lower expected returns in our model.
Oursimpleexampleillustratesonepossiblemechanismbywhichcompensationtodownside
risk may arise in equilibrium and how downside versus upside risk may priced differently. Of
course, this example, having only two assets, is simplistic. Nevertheless, the model provides
motivation to ask if downside and upside risk demand compensation in the cross section of
US stocks, and if such compensation is different in nature from compensation for risk based
on measures of higher moments, such as the Harvey-Siddique (2000a) coskewness measure.
As our model shows, the compensation for downside risk is in addition to the reward already
incurredinstandard, unconditionalriskexposures, suchastheregularunconditionalexposureto
the market factor reﬂected in the CAPM beta. In our empirical work, we investigate a premium
for downside risk also controlling for other known cross-sectional effects such as the size and
book-to-market effects explored by Fama and French (1992, 1993), the liquidity effect of P´ astor
and Stambaugh (2003), and the momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).
3 Downside Risk and Realized Returns
In this section, we document that stocks that strongly covary with the market, conditional on
down moves of the market, contemporaneously have high average returns. We document this
phenomenon by ﬁrst looking at patterns of realized returns for portfolios sorted on downside
risk in Section 3.1. Throughout, we take care in controlling for the regular beta and emphasize
the asymmetry in betas by focusing on relative downside beta in addition to downside beta.
In Section 3.2, we examine the reward to downside risk controlling for other cross-sectional
effects by using Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions. We disentangle the different effects of
coskewness risk and downside beta exposure in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 conducts various
robustnesstests. InSection3.5, weshowsomeadditionalusefulnessofaccountingfordownside
risk by examining if the commonly used Fama-French (1993) portfolios sorted by size and
book-to-market characteristics exhibit exposure to downside risk.
83.1 Regular, Downside, and Upside Betas
Research Design
If there is a cross-sectional relation between risk and return, then we should observe patterns
between average realized returns and the factor loadings associated with exposure to risk.
For example, the CAPM implies that stocks that covary strongly with the market have
contemporaneously high average returns over the same period. In particular, the CAPM predicts
an increasing relationship between realized average returns and realized factor loadings, or
contemporaneous expected returns and market betas. More generally, a multi-factor model
implies that we should observe patterns between average returns and sensitivities to different
sources of risk over the same time period used to compute the average returns and the factor
sensitivities.
Our research design follows Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), Fama and MacBeth (1973),
Fama and French (1992), Jagannathan and Wang (1996), and others, and focuses on the
contemporaneous relation between realized factor loadings and realized average returns. More
recently, in testing factor models, Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), Lewellen and Nagel (2004),
and Bansal, Dittmar and Lundblad (2005), among others, all employ risk measures that are
measured contemporaneously with returns. While both Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) and
Fama and French (1992) form portfolios based on pre-formation factor loadings, they continue
to perform their asset pricing tests using post-ranking factor loadings, computed using the full
sample. In particular, Fama and French (1992) ﬁrst form 25 portfolios ranked on the basis of
pre-formation size and market betas. Then, they compute ex-post factor loadings for these 25
portfolios over the full sample. At each month, they assign the post-formation beta of a stock
in a Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression to be the ex-post market factor loading of
the appropriate size and book-to-market sorted portfolio to which that stock belongs during that
month. Hence, testing a factor relation entails demonstrating a contemporaneous relationship
between realized covariance between a stock return and a factor with the realized average return
of that stock.
Our work differs from Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Fama and French (1992) in one
important way. Rather than forming portfolios based on pre-formation regression criteria and
then examining post-formation factor loadings, we directly sort stocks on the realized factor
loadings within a period and then compute realized average returns over the same period for
these portfolios. Whereas pre-formation factor loadings reﬂect both actual variation in factor
loadings as well as measurement error effects, post-formation factor dispersion occurs almost
exclusively from the actual covariation of stock returns with risk factors. Moreover, we estimate
9factor loadings using higher frequency data over shorter samples, rather than lower frequency
data over longer samples. Hence, our approach has greater power.
A number of studies, including Fama and MacBeth (1973), Shanken (1992), Ferson and
Harvey (1991), P´ astor and Stambaugh (2003), among others, compute predictive betas formed
using conditional information available at time t, and then examine returns over the next
period. These studies implicitly assume that risk exposures are constant and not time-varying.
Indeed, as noted by Daniel and Titman (1997), in settings where the covariance matrix is stable
over time, pre-formation factor loadings are good instruments for the future expected (post-
formation) factor loadings. If pre-formation betas are weak predictors of future betas, then
using pre-formation betas as instruments will also have low power to detect ex-post covariation
between factor loadings and realized returns. We examine the relation between pre-formation
estimates of factor loadings with post-formation realized factor loadings in Section 4.
Empirical Results
We investigate patterns between realized average returns and realized betas. While many cross-
sectional asset pricing studies use a horizon of one month, we work in intervals of twelve
months, from t to t+12, following Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995). Our choice of an annual
horizon is motivated by two concerns. First, we need a sufﬁciently large number of observations
to condition on periods of down markets. One month of daily data provides too short a window
for obtaining reliable estimates of downside variation. We check our the robustness of our
results to using intervals of 24 months with weekly frequency data to compute downside betas.
Second, Fama and French (1997), Ang and Chen (2004), and Lewellen and Nagel (2004) show
that market risk exposures are time-varying. Very long time intervals may cause the estimates
of conditional betas to be noisy. Fama and French (2005) also advocate estimating betas using
an annual horizon using daily data.
Over every twelve months period, we compute the sample counterparts to various risk
measures using daily data. We calculate a stock’s regular beta, downside beta as described
in equation (5), and upside beta as described in equation (9). We also compute a stock’s
relative downside beta, ¯¡ ¡ ¯, a stock’s relative upside beta, ¯+ ¡ ¯, and the difference
between upside beta and downside beta, ¯+ ¡ ¯¡. Since these risk measures are calculated
using realized returns, we refer to them as realized ¯, realized ¯¡, realized ¯+, realized relative
¯¡, realized relative ¯+, and realized ¯+ ¡ ¯¡.
In our empirical work, we concentrate on presenting the results of equal-weighted portfolios
and equal-weighted Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions. While a relationship between factor
10sensitivities and returns should hold for both an average stock (equal-weighting) or an average
dollar (value-weighting), we focus on computing equal-weighted portfolios because past work
on examining non-linearities in the cross-section has found risk due to asymmetries to be
bigger among smaller stocks. For example, the coskewness effect of Harvey and Siddique
(2000a) is strongest for equal-weighted portfolios.4 We work with equally-weighted portfolios
to emphasize the differences between downside risk and coskewness. In a series of robustness
checks, we also examine if our ﬁndings hold using value-weighted portfolios or in value-
weighted Fama-MacBeth regressions. We concentrate only on NYSE stocks to minimize
the illiquidity effects of small ﬁrms, but also consider all stocks on the NYSE, AMEX and
NASDAQ in robustness tests.
At the beginning of the one-year period at time t, we sort stocks into ﬁve quintiles based on
their realized ¯, realized ¯¡, realized ¯+, realized relative ¯¡, realized relative ¯+, or realized
¯+ ¡ ¯¡ over the next twelve months. In the column labelled “Return,” Table 1 reports the
average realized excess return from time t to t+12 in each equally-weighted quintile portfolio.
The table also reports the average cross-sectional realized ¯, ¯¡ or ¯+ of each quintile portfolio.
These average returns and betas are computed over the same 12-month period. Hence, Table 1
shows relationships between contemporaneous factor loadings and returns. Although we use a
1-year horizon, we evaluate 12-month returns at a monthly frequency. This use of overlapping
information is more efﬁcient, but induces moving average effects. To adjust for this, we report
t-statistics of differences in average excess returns between quintile portfolio 5 (high betas) and
quintile portfolio 1 (low betas) using 12 Newey-West (1987a) lags.5 The sample period is from
July 1963 to December 2001, with our last 12-month return period starting in January 2001. As
part of our robustness checks (below), we also examine non-overlapping sample periods.
Panel A of Table 1 shows a monotonically increasing pattern between realized average
returns and realized ¯. Quintile 1 (5) has an average excess return of 3.5% (13.9%) per annum,
and the spread in average excess returns between quintile portfolios 5 and 1 is 10.4% per annum,
with a corresponding difference in contemporaneous market betas of 1.36. Our results are
consistent with the earliest studies testing the CAPM, like Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972),
who ﬁnd a reward for holding higher beta stocks. However, this evidence per se does not
mean that the CAPM holds, because the CAPM predicts that no other variable other than beta
4 In their paper, Harvey and Siddique (2000a) state that they use value-weighted portfolios. From personal
correspondence with Cam Harvey, the coskewness effects arise most strongly in equal-weighted portfolios rather
than in value-weighted portfolios.
5 The theoretical number of lags required to absorb all the moving average error effects is 11, but we include an
additional lag for robustness.
11should explain a ﬁrm’s expected return. Nevertheless, it demonstrates that bearing high market
risk is rewarded with high average returns. Panel A also reports that the positive and negative
components of beta (¯¡ and ¯+). By construction, higher ¯¡ or higher ¯+ must also mean
higher unconditional ¯, so high average returns are accompanied by high ¯¡, ¯+ and regular
¯. Note that for these portfolios sorted by realized ¯, the spread in realized ¯¡ and ¯+ is also
similar to the spread in realized ¯. In the remainder of the panels in Table 1, we decompose the
reward for unconditional market risk into downside and upside components.
Panel B shows that stocks with high contemporaneous ¯¡ have high average returns. Stocks
in the quintile with the lowest (highest) ¯¡ earn 2.7% (14.5%) per annum in excess of the risk-
free rate. The average difference between quintile portfolio 5 and 1 is 11.8% per annum, which
is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. These results are consistent with agents disliking
downside risk and avoiding stocks that covary strongly when the market dips, such as the DA
representative agent described in Section 2. Stocks with high ¯¡ must carry a premium in
order to entice agents to hold them. An alternative explanation is that agents have no particular
emphasis on downside risk versus upside potential. High ¯¡ stocks may earn high returns
simply because, by construction, high ¯¡ stocks have high regular ¯. The average ¯¡ spread
between quintile portfolios 5 and 1 is very large (0.19 to 1.92), but sorting on ¯¡ also produces
variation in ¯ and ¯+. However, the variation in ¯ or ¯+ is not as disperse as the variation
in ¯¡. Another possible explanation is that sorting on high contemporaneous covariance with
the market mechanically produces high contemporaneous returns. However, this concern is not
applicable to our downside risk measure since we are picking out precisely those observations
for which stocks already have very low returns when the market declines. In Panels C and D,
we demonstrate that it is the reward for downside risk alone that is behind the pattern of high
¯¡ stocks earning high returns.
In Panel C of Table 1, we sort stocks by realized relative downside beta (¯¡ ¡ ¯).
Relative downside beta focuses on the incremental impact of downside beta over the regular,
unconditional market beta. Panel C shows that stocks with high realized relative ¯¡ have high
average returns. The difference in average excess returns between portfolios 5 and 1 is 6.6%
per annum and is highly signiﬁcant with a robust t-statistic of 7.70. We can rule out that this
pattern of returns is attributable to regular beta because the ¯ loadings are ﬂat over the quintile
portfolios. Hence, the high realized returns from high relative ¯¡ are produced by the exposure
to downside risk, measured by high ¯¡ loadings.
Panel D shows a smaller spread for average realized excess returns for stocks sorted on
realized ¯+, relative to the spreads for ¯ and ¯¡ in Panels A and B. Since ¯+ only measures
exposure to a rising market, stocks that rise more when the market return increases should be
12more attractive and, on average, earn low returns. We do not observe a discount for stocks
that have attractive upside exposure. We ﬁnd that low (high) ¯+ stocks earn, on average, 5.7%
(9.8%) per annum in excess of the risk-free rate. This pattern of high returns to high ¯+ loadings
seems to be inconsistent with agents having strong preferences for upside potential, however,
this measure does not control for the effects of regular ¯ or for the effects of ¯¡. Instead, the
increasing pattern of returns in Panel D may be due to the patterns of ¯ or ¯¡, which increase
from quintile portfolios 1 to 5. The spread in regular ¯ is 1.05, while the spread in ¯¡ is 0.83.
From the CAPM, high ¯ implies high returns, and if agents dislike downside risk, high ¯¡ also
implies high returns. Hence, we now turn to measures that control for these effects to examine
an upside risk premium.
In Panel E, we investigate the effect of ¯+ while controlling for regular ¯ by sorting stocks
according to realized relative upside beta, (¯+¡¯). Panel E shows that stocks with high realized
relative ¯+ have low returns. We ﬁnd that high (low) relative ¯+ stocks earn, on average 4.4%
(10.5%) per annum in excess of the risk-free rate. Furthermore, stocks sorted by relative upside
beta produce a spread in ¯+ while keeping the spread in regular ¯ and ¯¡ relatively ﬂat. The
differences in regular ¯ and ¯¡ across the highest quintile and the lowest quintile (¯+ ¡ ¯)
portfolios are relatively low at 0.12 and -0.23, respectively. In contrast, we obtain a wide spread
in ¯+ of 1.31 between the highest quintile and the lowest quintile portfolios. This pattern of
low returns to high relative ¯+ stocks is consistent with agents accepting a discount for holding
stocks with high upside potential, which would result from the DA agent equilibrium in Section
2.
Finally, we sort stocks by the realized difference between upside beta and downside beta
(¯+ ¡ ¯¡) in Table 1, Panel F. We look at this measure to gauge the effect of upside risk
relative to downside risk. In Panel F, we observe a decreasing pattern in average realized excess
returns with increasing (¯+ ¡ ¯¡). On average, we ﬁnd that stocks with high (low) (¯+ ¡ ¯¡)
earn 3.6% (11.4%) per annum in excess of the risk-free rate. While this direction is consistent
with a premium for downside risk and a discount for upside potential, it is hard to separate
the effects of downside risk independently from upside risk using these (¯+ ¡ ¯¡) portfolio
sorts. The quintile portfolios sorted by (¯+ ¡ ¯¡) show little variation in regular ¯, but they
show a decreasing pattern in ¯¡ and an increasing pattern in ¯+. Hence, it is difﬁcult to separate
whetherthepatternsinrealizedreturnsarisebecauseofexposuretodownsidelossesorexposure
to upside gains. Thus, our preferred measures to examine downside or upside risk are relative
¯¡ and relative ¯+ in Panels C and E, which control for the effect of ¯.
In summary, Table 1 demonstrates that downside risk is rewarded in the cross-section of
stock returns. Stocks with high ¯¡ loadings earn high average returns over the same period that
13are not mechanically driven by high regular, unconditional betas. Stocks that covary strongly
with the market conditional on positive moves of the market command signiﬁcant discounts.
However, all these relations do not control for other known patterns in the cross-section of
stock returns, which we now investigate.
3.2 Fama-MacBeth Regressions
A long literature from Banz (1981) onwards has shown that various ﬁrm characteristics also
have explanatory power in the cross-section. The size effect (Banz, 1981), the book-to-market
effect (Basu, 1983), the momentum effect (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), the volatility effect
(Ang et al., 2005), exposure to coskewness risk (Harvey and Siddique, 2000a), exposure to
cokurtosis risk (Scott and Horvarth, 1980; Dittmar, 2002), and exposure to aggregate liquidity
risk (P´ astor and Stambaugh, 2003), all imply different patterns for the cross-section of expected
returns. We now demonstrate that downside risk is different from all of these effects by
performing a series of cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions at the ﬁrm level,
over the sample period from July 1963 to December 2001.
We run Fama-MacBeth regressions of excess returns on ﬁrm characteristics and realized
betas with respect to various sources of risk. We use a 12-month horizon for excess returns to
correspond to the contemporaneous period over which our risk measures are calculated. Since
the regressions are run using a 12-month horizon, but at the overlapping monthly frequency, we
compute the standard errors of the coefﬁcients by using 12 Newey-West (1987a) lags. Table 2
reports the results listed by various sets of independent variables in Regressions I-VI. We also
report means and standard deviations to help gauge economic signiﬁcance. We regress realized
ﬁrm returns over a 12-month horizon (t to t + 12) on realized market beta, downside beta and
upside beta, (¯, ¯¡, and ¯+) computed over the same period. Hence, these regressions capture
a contemporaneous relationship between average returns and factor loadings or characteristics.
We control for log-size, book-to-market ratio, and past 12-month excess returns of the ﬁrm at
the beginning of the period t. We also include realized standard deviation of the ﬁrm excess
returns, realized coskewness, and realized cokurtosis as control variables. All of these are
also computed over the period from t to t + 12. We deﬁne cokurtosis in a similar manner to
coskewness in equation (6):
cokurt =
E[(ri ¡ ¹i)(rm ¡ ¹m)3]
p
var(ri)var(rm)3=2 ; (10)
where ri is the ﬁrm excess return, rm is the market excess return, ¹i is the average excess stock
return, and ¹m is the average market excess returns. Finally, we also include the P´ astor and
14Stambaugh (2003) historical liquidity beta at time t to proxy for liquidity exposure.
In order to avoid putting too much weight on extreme observations, each month we
Winsorize all independent variables at the 1% and 99% levels.6 Winsorization has been
performed in cross-sectional regressions by Knez and Ready (1997), among others, and ensures
that extreme outliers do not drive the results. It is particularly valuable for dealing with the
book-to-market ratio, because extremely large book-to-market values are sometimes observed
due to low prices, particularly before a ﬁrm delists.
We begin with Regression I in Table 2 to show the familiar, standard set of cross-sectional
return patterns. While the regular market beta carries a positive coefﬁcient, the one-factor
CAPM is rejected because ¯ is not a sufﬁcient statistic to explain the cross-section of stock
returns. The results of the regression conﬁrm several CAPM anomalies found in the literature.
For example, small stocks and stocks with high book-to-market ratios are linked with have
high average returns (see Fama and French, 1992), while stocks with high past returns also
continue to have high returns (see Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). The very large and highly
signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient (-8.43) on the ﬁrm’s realized volatility of excess returns conﬁrms
the anomalous ﬁnding of Ang et al. (2005), who ﬁnd that stocks with high return volatilities
have low average returns. Consistent with Harvey and Siddique (2000a), stocks with high
coskewness have low returns. Finally, stocks with positive cokurtosis tend to have high returns,
consistent with Dittmar (2002).
In Regressions II-VI, we separately examine the downside and upside components of beta
and show that downside risk is priced.7 We turn ﬁrst to Regression II, which reveals that
downside risk and upside risk are priced asymmetrically. The coefﬁcient on downside risk is
positive (0.069) and highly signiﬁcant, conﬁrming the portfolio sorts in Table 1. The coefﬁcient
on ¯+ is negative (-0.029), but lower in magnitude than the coefﬁcient on ¯¡. These results are
consistent with the positive premium on relative ¯¡ and the discount on relative ¯¡ reported in
Panels C and E of Table 1.
Regression III shows that the reward for both downside and upside risk is robust to
controlling for size, book-to-market and momentum effects. Note that asymmetric beta risk
does not remove the book-to-market or momentum effects. But, importantly, the Fama-
6 For example, if an observation for the ﬁrm’s book-to-market ratio is extremely large and above the 99th
percentile of all the ﬁrms’ book-to-market ratios that month, we replace that ﬁrm’s book-to-market ratio with the
book-to-market ratio corresponding to the 99th percentile. The same is done for ﬁrms whose book-to-market ratios
lie below the 1%-tile of all ﬁrms’ book-to-market ratios that month.
7 By construction, ¯ is a weighted average of ¯¡ and ¯+. If we place both ¯ and ¯¡ on the RHS of Regressions
II-VI and omit ¯+, the coefﬁcients on ¯¡ are the same to three decimal places as the ¯¡ coefﬁcients reported in
Table 2. Similarly, if we specify both ¯ and ¯+ to be regressors, the coefﬁcients on ¯+ are almost unchanged.
15MacBeth coefﬁcients for ¯¡ and ¯+ remain almost unchanged from their Regression II
estimates at 0.064 and -0.025, respectively. While neither ¯¡ nor ¯+ are sufﬁcient statistics
to explain the cross-section of stock returns, Table 2 demonstrates a robust reward for holding
stocks with high (low) ¯¡ (¯+) loadings controlling for the standard size, book-to-market, and
past return effects.
In Regressions IV-VI, accounting for additional measures of risk does not drive out the
signiﬁcance of ¯¡ but drives out the signiﬁcance of ¯+. Once we account for coskewness risk
in Regression IV, the coefﬁcient on ¯+ becomes very small (0.003) and becomes statistically
insigniﬁcant, with a t-statistic of 0.22. Controlling for coskewness also brings down the
coefﬁcient on ¯¡ from 0.064 in Regression III (without the coskewness risk control) to 0.028
in Regression IV (with the coskewness risk control). Nevertheless, the premium for downside
risk remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant. In Regression V, where we add controls for
realized ﬁrm volatility and realized ﬁrm cokurtosis, the coefﬁcient on downside risk remains
consistently positive at 0.062, and also remains highly statistically signiﬁcant, with a robust
t-statistic of 6.00. While the preference function of Section 2 that weights downside outcomes
more than upside outcomes implies a discount for upside risk, we observe these patterns in
data only for Regressions II and III, where the upside discount is, in absolute value, about half
the size of the premium for downside risk. After the additional controls beyond size, book-to-
market, and momentum are included in Regressions IV and V, the discount for potential upside
becomes fragile. Thus, the premium for downside risk dominates in the cross-section.
Finally, Regression VI investigates the reward for downside and upside risk controlling
for the full list of ﬁrm characteristics and realized factor loadings. We lose ﬁve years of
data in constructing the P´ astor-Stambaugh historical liquidity betas, so this regression is run
from January 1967 to December 2001. The coefﬁcient on ¯¡ is 0.056, with a robust t-
statistic of 5.25. In contrast, the coefﬁcient on ¯+ is statistically insigniﬁcant, whereas the
premium for coskewness is signiﬁcantly negative, at -0.188. Since both ¯¡ and coskewness risk
measure downside risk, and the coefﬁcients on both risk measures are statistically signiﬁcant,
we carefully disentangle the ¯¡ and coskewness effects in Section 3.4.
To help interpret the economic magnitudes of the risk premia reported in the Fama-MacBeth
regressions, the last column of Table 2 reports the time-series average of the cross-sectional
mean and standard deviation of each of the factor loadings or characteristics. The average
market beta is less than one (0.83) because we are focusing on NYSE ﬁrms, which tend to be
skewed towards large ﬁrms with relatively low betas. The average downside beta is 0.88, with
a cross-sectional standard deviation of 0.74. This implies that for a downside risk premium of
6.9% per annum, a two standard deviation move across stocks in terms of ¯¡ corresponds to a
16change in expected returns of 2 £ 0:069 £ 0:74 = 10:2% per annum. While the premium on
coskewness appears much larger in magnitude, at approximately -19% per annum, coskewness
is not a beta and must be carefully interpreted. A two standard deviation movement across
coskewness changes expected returns by 2£0:188£0:19 = 7:1% per annum, which is slightly
less than, but of the same order of magnitude as, the effect of downside risk.
The consistent message from the regressions in Table 2 is that reward for downside risk ¯¡
is always positive at approximately 6% per annum and statistically signiﬁcant. High downside
beta is compensated for by high average returns, and this result is robust to controlling for other
ﬁrm characteristics and risk characteristics, including upside beta. Moreover, downside beta
risk remains signiﬁcantly positive in the presence of coskewness risk controls. On the other
hand, the reward for upside risk (¯+) is not robust. A priori, we expect the coefﬁcient on ¯+ to
be negative, but in data, it often ﬂips sign and is insigniﬁcant when we control for other cross-
sectional risk attributes. Thus, aversion to downside risk is priced more strongly, and more
robustly, in the cross-section than investors’ attraction to upside potential.
3.3 Downside Beta Risk and Coskewness Risk
The Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions in Table 2 demonstrate that both downside beta and
coskewness have very robust, predictive power for the cross-section of stock returns. Since
both ¯¡ and coskewness capture the effect of asymmetric higher moments and downside risk,
we now measure the magnitude of the reward for exposure to downside beta, while explicitly
controlling for the effect of coskewness. Table 3 presents the results of this exercise.
To control for the effect of coskewness, we ﬁrst form quintile portfolios sorted on
coskewness. Then, within each coskewness quintile, we sort stocks into ﬁve equally-weighted
portfolios based on ¯¡. Both coskewness and ¯¡ are computed over the same 12-month horizon
for which we examine realized excess returns. After forming the 5 £ 5 coskewness and ¯¡
portfolios, we average the realized excess returns of each ¯¡ quintile over the ﬁve coskewness
portfolios. This characteristic control procedure creates a set of quintile ¯¡ portfolios with near-
identical levels of coskewness risk. Thus, these quintile ¯¡ portfolios control for differences in
coskewness.
Panel A of Table 3 reports average excess returns of the 25 coskewness £ ¯¡ portfolios.
The column labelled “Average” reports the average 12-month excess returns of the ¯¡ quintiles
controllingforcoskewnessrisk. Therowlabelled“High-Low”reportsthedifferencesinaverage
returns between the ﬁrst and ﬁfth quintile ¯¡ portfolios within each coskewness quintile. The
last row reports the 5-1 quintile difference for the ¯¡ quintiles that control for the effect of
17coskewness exposure. The average excess return of 7.6% per annum in the bottom right entry of
Panel A is the difference in average returns between the ﬁfth and ﬁrst ¯¡ quintile portfolios that
control for coskewness risk. This difference has a robust t-statistic of 4.16. Hence, coskewness
risk cannot account for the reward for bearing downside beta risk.
In Panel A, the patterns within each coskewness quintile moving from low ¯¡ to high
¯¡ stocks (reading down each column) are very interesting. As coskewness increases, the
differences in average excess returns due to different ¯¡ loadings decrease. The effect is quite
pronounced. In the ﬁrst coskewness quintile, the difference in average returns between the low
and high ¯¡ quintiles is 14.6% per annum. The average return difference in the low and high ¯¡
portfolios decreases to 2.1% per annum for the quintile of stocks with the highest coskewness.
The reason for this pattern is as follows. As deﬁned in equation (6), coskewness is
effectively the covariance of a stock’s return with the square of the market return, or with the
volatility of the market. A stock with negative coskewness tends to have low returns when
market volatility is high. These are also usually, but not always, periods of low market returns.
Volatility of the market treats upside and downside risk symmetrically, so both extreme upside
and extreme downside movements of the market have the same volatility. Hence, the prices of
stocks with large negative coskewness tend to decrease when the market falls, but the prices of
these stocks may also decrease when the market rises. In contrast, downside beta concentrates
only on the former effect by explicitly considering only the downside case. When coskewness
is low, there is a wide spread in ¯¡ because there is large scope for market volatility to represent
both large negative and large positive changes. This explains the large spread in average returns
across the ¯¡ quintiles for stocks with low coskewness.
The small 2.1% per annum 5-1 spread for the ¯¡ quintiles for the highest coskewness
stocks is due to the highest coskewness stocks exhibiting little asymmetry. The distribution of
coskewnessacrossstocksisskewedtowardsthenegativesideandisnegativeonaverage. Across
the low to the high coskewness quintiles in Panel A, the average coskewness ranges from -0.41
to0.09. Hence, the quintileof the highestcoskewnessstockshavelittlecoskewness. Thismeans
that high coskewness stocks essentially do not change their behavior across periods where
market returns are stable or volatile. Furthermore, the range of ¯¡ in the highest coskewness
quintile is also smaller. The small range of ¯¡ for the highest coskewness stocks explains the
low 2.1% spread for the ¯¡ quintiles in the second last column of Panel A.
Panel B of Table 3 repeats the same exercise as Panel A, except we examine the reward
for coskewness controlling for different levels of ¯¡. Panel B ﬁrst sorts stocks on coskewness
before sorting on ¯¡, and then averages across the ¯¡ quintiles. This exercise examines the
coskewness premium controlling for downside exposure. Controlling for ¯¡, the 5-1 difference
18in average returns for coskewness portfolios is -6.2%, which is highly statistically signiﬁcant
with a t-statistic of 8.17. Moreover, there are large and highly statistically signiﬁcant spreads
for coskewness in every ¯¡ quintile. Coskewness is able to maintain a high range within each
¯¡ portfolio, unlike the diminishing range for ¯¡ within each coskewness quintile in Panel A.
In summary, downside beta risk and coskewness risk are different. The high returns to high
¯¡ stocks are robust to controlling for coskewness risk, and vice versa. Downside beta risk
is strongest for stocks with low coskewness. Coskewness does not differentiate between large
market movements on the upside or the downside. For stocks with low coskewness, downside
beta is better able to capture the downside risk premium associated only with market declines
than an unconditional coskewness measure.
3.4 Robustness Checks
We now show that our results do not depend on the way we have measured asymmetries in
betas or the design of our empirical tests. In particular, we show that our results are robust
to measuring asymmetries with respect to different cutoff points across up-markets and down-
markets. We also show that our results are robust to using longer frequency data. Finally, we
show that our results are not driven by using equal weighting, concentrating on NYSE stocks, or
using overlapping portfolios by checking robustness with respect to value weighting, including
all stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ, and using non-overlapping portfolios.
We begin by using other cutoff points to determine up-markets and down-markets. Our
measures of ¯¡ and ¯+ use returns relative to realized average market excess return. Naturally,
realized average market returns vary across time and may have particularly low or high
realizations. Alternatively, rather than using the average market excess return as the cutoff
point between up-markets and down-markets, we can also use the risk-free rate or the zero rate
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19correlated with each other. Given these correlations, it is not surprising that reproducing Table
1 and Table 2 using either one of these alternative cutoff points yields almost identical results.8
Therefore, the ﬁnding of a downside risk premium is indeed being driven by emphasizing losses
versus gains, rather than by using a particular cutoff point for the benchmark.
Table 4 also shows that the regular measure of beta is quite different from measures of
downside beta and upside beta. The correlation between regular beta with downside beta or
upside beta is 0.78 and 0.76, respectively. Therefore, downside beta and upside beta capture
different aspects of risk, and are not simply reﬂective of the regular, unconditional market beta.
Interestingly, the correlation between downside beta and upside beta is only around 0.46. Thus,
a high downside risk exposures does not necessarily imply a high upside risk exposure. We
examine further the cross-sectional determinants of future downside risk exposure below in
Section 4.
We now turn to additional robustness checks to make sure our ﬁndings are being driven
by variation in downside risk rather than by some statistical bias introduced by our testing
method. In Table 5, we subject our results to a battery of additional robustness checks. Here,
we check to see if our results are robust to excluding small stocks, using longer frequency
data to compute ¯¡ and relative ¯¡, creating value-weighted portfolios, using all stocks, and
using non-overlapping annual observations.9 We report the robustness checks for realized ¯¡
in Panel A and for realized relative ¯¡ in Panel B. In each panel, we report average 12-month
(or 24-month) excess returns of quintile portfolios sorted by realized ¯¡, or realized relative ¯¡,
over the same period. The table also reports the differences in average excess returns between
quintile portfolios 5 and 1 with robust t-statistics.
One possible worry is that our use of daily returns introduces a bias due to non-synchronous
trading. Indeed, one of the reasons for our focus on just the NYSE is to minimize these effects.
To further check the inﬂuence of very small stocks, the ﬁrst column of Table 5 excludes from
our sample stocks that fall within the lowest size quintile. When small stocks are removed,
the difference between quintile 5 and 1 for the stocks sorted by realized ¯¡ remains strongly
statistically signiﬁcant (with a robust t-statistic of 4.54) at 8.34% per annum, but is slightly
reduced from the 5-1 difference of 11.8% per annum when small stocks are included in Table 1.
8 These results are available upon request.
9 In addition, we conduct further robustness checks that are available upon request. In particular, to control for
the inﬂuence of non-synchronous trading, we also repeat our exercise using control for non-synchronous trading
in a manner analogous to using a Scholes-Williams (1977) correction to compute the downside betas. Although
this method is ad hoc, using this correction does not change our results. We also ﬁnd that the point estimates of
the premiums are almost unchanged when we exclude stocks that fall into the highest volatility quintile with the
downside risk premium still statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
20Similarly, the 5-1 difference in average returns for relative ¯¡ also remains highly signiﬁcant.
The second column computes ¯¡ and (¯¡ ¡ ¯) using two years of weekly data, rather than
one year of daily data. We compute weekly returns from Wednesdays to Tuesdays, and use two
years of data to ensure that we have a sufﬁcient number of observations to compute the factor
loadings. We report the contemporaneous 24-month realized return over the same 24-month
period used to measure the downside risk loadings. The table shows that there is no change in
our basic message: there exists a reward for exposures to downside risk and relative downside
risk.10
In the third column of Table 5, we examine the impact of constructing value-weighted
portfolios rather than equal-weighted portfolios. Using value weighting preserves the large
spreads in average excess returns for sorts by ¯¡ and relative ¯¡. In particular, the 5-1 spread
of value-weighted quintile portfolios in realized returns from sorting on realized ¯¡ is 7.1% per
annum. Although this has reduced from 11.8% per annum using equal-weighted portfolios in
Table 1, the difference remains statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Similarly, the 5-1 spread
in relative ¯¡ portfolios in Panel B reduces from 6.6% per annum using equal weighting to
4.0% per annum with value weighting. This difference is also signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
In the fourth column, labelled “All Stocks,” we use all stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX
and NASDAQ, rather than restricting ourselves to stocks listed on the NYSE. We form equal-
weighted quintile portfolios at the beginning of the period based on realized beta rankings. To
keep our results comparable with our earlier results, we use breakpoints calculated over just the
NYSE stocks. Using all stocks increases the average excess returns, so our main results using
only the NYSE universe are conservative. The 5-1 spreads in average excess returns increase
substantially using all stocks. For the ¯¡ (relative ¯¡) quintile portfolios, the 5-1 difference
increases to 15.2% (8.6%) per annum, compared to 11.8% (6.6%) per annum using only NYSE
stocks. By limiting our universe to NYSE stocks, we deliberately understate our results to avoid
confounding inﬂuences of illiquidity and non-synchronous trading.
In our last robustness check in Table 5, we use non-overlapping observations. While the
use of the overlapping 12-month horizon in Tables 1 and 2 is statistically efﬁcient, we examine
the effect of using non-overlapping 12-month periods in the last column of Table 5. Our 12-
month periods start at the beginning of January and end in December of each calendar year.
With non-overlapping samples, it is not necessary to control for the moving average errors with
10 We have also reproduced the Fama-MacBeth regressions using risk measures calculated at the weekly
frequency and found virtually identical results to Table 2. In addition, when we examine realized betas and realized
returns over a 60-month horizon using monthly frequency returns, we ﬁnd the same qualitative patterns that are
statistically signiﬁcant as using a 12-month horizon.
21robust t-statistics, but we have fewer observations. Nevertheless, the results show that the point
estimates of the 5-1 spreads are still statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Not surprisingly,
the point estimates remain roughly unchanged from Table 1.
In unreported results, we also conduct additional robustness checks to value-weighting and
using all stocks in a Fama-MacBeth regression setting. First, we run a set of value-weighted
Fama-MacBeth regressions to make sure that small stocks are not driving our results. We do
this by running a cross-sectional weighted least squares regression for each period, where the
weights are the market capitalization of a ﬁrm at the beginning of each period. Using value-
weighted regressions continues to produce a strong, statistically signiﬁcant, positive relation
between downside risk and contemporaneous returns with or without any additional controls.
Similar to the results of using all stocks in the portfolio formations of Table 5, using all stocks
in the Fama-MacBeth regressions only increases the magnitude of the downside risk premium,
which remains overwhelmingly statistically signiﬁcant.
3.5 Downside Risk in Size and Book-to-Market Portfolios
While we have demonstrated that exposures to high ¯¡ or high relative ¯¡ loadings are
compensated by high average returns and this effect is consistent with investors placing greater
weight on downside risk, we have not demonstrated that downside risk is useful in pricing
portfolios sorted on other attributes. We now examine if portfolios of stocks sorted by other
stock characteristics also exhibit contemporaneous exposure to downside risk. We focus on
the Fama and French (1993) set of 25 portfolios sorted by size and book-to-market. To price
these portfolios, Fama and French (1993) develop a linear asset pricing model that augments
the excess market return factor, rm, with size and value factors (SMB and HML, respectively).
Table 6 examines if these portfolios exhibit exposure to downside risk, even after controlling
for the standard Fama-French model.
In Table 6, we examine linear factor models of the form:
m = a + bm ¢ rm + bm¡ ¢ r
¡
m + bSMB ¢ SMB + bHML ¢ HML; (13)
where r¡
m = min(rm;¹m) equals rm if the excess market return is below its sample mean, or
its sample mean otherwise. We estimate the coefﬁcients bm, bm¡, bSMB, and bHML by GMM
using the moment conditions:
E(mr) = 0; (14)
where r is a vector of the 25 Fama-French portfolios. The coefﬁcient bm¡ reveals the exposure
22of the test portfolios to downside risk.11 We conduct a Â2 speciﬁcation test to examine the
ﬁt with and ﬁt without the downside risk exposure of various speciﬁcations of equation (13).
Speciﬁcally, we compute a ¢J Â2 difference test of Newey and West (1987b) using an optimal
weighting matrix of the moment conditions under the unrestricted model of the alternative
hypothesis. In particular, if we reject the null hypothesis that b¡
m = 0, then we conclude that the
restrictions imposed by the null hypothesis model that there is no downside risk exposure is too
restrictive.
We consider two null models in Table 6, the null of the CAPM (Speciﬁcation I) and the null
of the Fama-French model (Speciﬁcation III). In both alternatives (Speciﬁcations II and IV),
Table 6 shows that the coefﬁcient b¡
m is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This indicates
that for pricing the size and book-to-market portfolios, the downside portion of market return
plays a signiﬁcant role, even in the presence of the standard market factor. This is true even
when we allow for SMB and HML to be present in the model. This is a strong result because
the SMB and HML factors are constructed speciﬁcally to explain the size and value premia
of the 25 Fama-French portfolios. For both the CAPM and the Fama-French model, the ¢J
test strongly rejects both speciﬁcations in favor of allowing for downside market risk. For the
Fama-French model, the p-value of the rejection is almost zero.
Thus, not only do individual stocks sorted directly on ¯¡ loadings reveal a large reward for
stocks with high downside risk exposure, but other portfolios commonly used in asset pricing
also exhibit exposure to downside risk. In particular, linear factor model tests using the Fama
and French (1993) size and book-to-market portfolios reject the hypothesis that these portfolios
do not have exposure to downside market risk.
4 Predicting Future Downside Risk
The previous section demonstrates a strong positive relationship between stocks that exhibit
high downside risk and returns for holding such stocks over the same period. While this is the
essence of the relationship implied by a risk-to-reward explanation, knowing this relationship
may not be of practical value if we cannot predict downside risk prior to the holding period.
Therefore, we now examine if we can predict downside risk in a future period using past
information. If today’s information can predict future downside risk, then we can form an
11 Note that the factor r¡
m is not traded, and thus the alpha of a time-series regression using the factors in equation
(13) does not represent the return of an investable strategy. Therefore, the alpha cannot be tested against the value
of zero to examine possible mispricing. Similarly, we cannot compute a premium for a traded downside risk factor
from equation (13).
23investable trading strategy that has exposure to downside risk. In particular, one potential
valuable predictor of future downside risk exposure may be the covariation of a stock with
market down movements in the past if downside risk is a persistent risk characteristic of stocks.
In Section 4.1, we explore the determinants of downside risk using past information. Section
4.2 examines returns of portfolios of stocks sorted by past downside risk, as well as sorts by
past coskewness. We ﬁnd that forecasting future downside risk is difﬁcult for stocks with high
volatility and we explore why in Section 4.3. Nevertheless, we can forecast future downside
risk, and predict high future returns for stocks with high past downside risk for a large portion
of the market. We conduct additional robustness checks in Section 4.4.
4.1 Determinants of Future Downside Risk Exposure
In this section, we begin by exploring the cross-sectional determinants of downside risk. Since
we have very little theoretical guidance as to what ﬁrm characteristics determine riskiness of a
stock, our investigation is merely exploratory in nature. Our analysis complements Harvey and
Siddique (2000b), who characterize volatility and coskewness risk, and Ang and Chen (2002),
who examine how some stock characteristics are related to upside and downside correlations.
Neither one of these studies examines how downside beta is related to ﬁrm characteristics at the
individual stock level. In Table 7, we explore how relative downside betas are correlated with
other cross-sectional variables. We run Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions of realized relative
downside beta on various ﬁrm characteristics that are known ex-ante and on other future risk
characteristics measured ex-post. In particular, ﬁnding some ﬁrm characteristics that are cross-
sectionally correlated with future downside beta can help us develop some possible investable
strategy that generates a future spread in downside beta, and hence, future returns.
In Table 7, we ﬁrst consider regressions of future realized relative downside beta over the
next 12 months on variables that are estimated over the past 12 months in the columns labelled
“Past Variables.” All the independent variables in these regressions are measured in a period
priortotherealizationofrelativedownsidebeta. Theregressionsarerunatamonthlyfrequency,
so we use 12 Newey-West (1987a) lags. Regressions I-X use one independent variable at a
time, in addition to industry dummy variables, while Regression XI uses all the past variables
simultaneously.12
12 Industry classiﬁcations are based on groupings of two-digit Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) codes
following Ferson and Harvey (1991). They are Miscellaneous, Petroleum, Finance, Durables, Basic Industry,
Food & Tobacco, Construction, Capital Goods, Transportation, Utilities, Textile & Trade, Service and Leisure.
In unreported results, we ﬁnd very little pattern of downside risk exposure across industries, except that utilities
generally exhibit lower exposure to downside risk than other industries. This is consistent with the notion that
24Regression I shows that past relative beta does predict future relative beta over the next 12
months. However, while highly statistically signiﬁcant, the coefﬁcient is only 0.077 and far
from one. Hence, future relative downside beta is difﬁcult to predict simply by using past
relative downside risk. In fact, the average 12-month autocorrelation of relative downside
risk across all NYSE stocks is only 0.082, which is signiﬁcantly lower than the average
autocorrelation of downside beta at 0.435 and regular beta at 0.675. Thus, although past
downside risk can also be used to predict future downside risk, we should expect that using
only past downside risk to predict future downside risk is difﬁcult.
In Regressions II-X, we examine how past ﬁrm characteristics are related to future relative
downside beta. Past standard volatility increases relative downside beta, while smaller stocks
tend to exhibit greater relative downside risk. While Regression IV suggests that value stocks
exhibit greater relative downside risk, controlling for additional characteristics in Regressions
XI indicates that it is growth stocks which tend to have more relative downside risk. This is
consistent with the results in Table 6 that downside risk is present in the Fama-French size and
book-to-market portfolios. Stocks that are past winners also exhibit greater relative downside
risk, consistent with the interpretation in Rouwenhorst (1998).
Regressions VI-VIII relate accounting measures of performance (return on equity, ROE;
asset growth; and sales growth) with downside risk. There is strong evidence that stocks with
high past ROE tend to have high future high exposure to downside risk. In contrast, the evidence
for asset or sales growth as predictors of future downside relative beta is weak, as either one of
these variables are statistically insigniﬁcant on their own, or statistically insigniﬁcant in the full
Regression XI. Regression IX shows that there is little leverage effect in relative downside risk.
In Regression IX, we use a dummy variable that equals one if the ﬁrm has paid a dividend in the
past 12 months. Dividend-paying ﬁrms exhibit less relative downside risk, though this relation
disappears when we include all of these variables simultaneously in Regression XI.13
In Regressions XII and XIII of Table 7, we include other contemporaneous risk measures
on the RHS. The motivation behind these regressions is that we want to remove any possible
confounding effects of other risk factors that are correlated with downside risk. We include
as independent variables the stock’s standard deviation, coskewness, cokurtosis, and P´ astor-
Stambaugh (2003) liquidity betas, all of which are measured over the same 12-month interval
utilities are traditionally defensive stocks that tend to hold their value relative to other industries during market
downturns.
13 In an unreported table, we do ﬁnd that ﬁrms with low ROE, high growth, and high leverage have high downside
beta – but, these characteristics do not add more than what is already captured by regular beta. We also ﬁnd that
dividend-paying ﬁrms exhibit less downside risk, without accounting for the regular beta.
25as the realized relative downside beta. We ﬁnd that high volatility, negative coskewness, and
high cokurtosis are all related to greater future relative downside risk. Note that realized high
relative downside beta is contemporaneously correlated with negative coskewness and high
cokurtosis, both of which are associated with average high returns (see Harvey and Siddique,
2000a; Dittmar, 2002), but earlier Tables 2 and Table 3 show that the downside beta is different
from coskewness and cokurtosis risk. However, the effect of standard deviation is just the
opposite – high downside beta is contemporaneously associated with high average returns, but
high standard deviation is associated with lower average returns. This is consistent with Ang
et al. (2005). Therefore, Regression XIII suggests that in order to ﬁnd an investable strategy
that provides a spread in downside beta, controlling for volatility may be necessary. Finally,
Regression XIII shows that the P´ astor-Stambaugh liquidity effect is not related to relative
downside risk.
4.2 Past Downside Risk and Future Returns
The results of Section 3 suggest that downside betas are contemporaneously correlated with
high average returns. However, a trading strategy to exploit this pattern of expected returns must
successfully predict future downside beta loadings from past information. We now examine if
stocks simply sorted on past downside risk provide enough variation in future downside risk
to provide large spreads in future returns. However, given the results of Table 7, we expect
that using only past downside beta to predict future downside beta might be difﬁcult since past
downside beta is a poor predictor of future downside beta. We conﬁrm that this is indeed the
case using a portfolio trading rule. Fortunately, the Fama-MacBeth regressions in Table 7 also
suggest a way of reﬁning the simple trading strategies, which we implement in Section 4.3.
To construct these investable portfolios, we sort stocks into portfolios at time t based on
pre-formation characteristics, and then examine monthly holding period returns from t to t+1.
Our main pre-formation criterion is downside beta computed using daily returns over the past
12 months. At the beginning of each month t, we sort stocks into ﬁve quintiles based on their
past ¯¡ and coskewness. In the column labelled “Return,” we report the average realized excess
return over the next month from t to t + 1. The sample period is from July 1962 to January
2001, with our ﬁrst twelve-month risk measurement period ending in June 1963 for the portfolio
formation in July 1963.
Panel A of Table 8 reports the differences in the excess returns between the highest and the
lowest past ¯¡ quintile portfolios in the row labelled “High-Low.” We also report the cross-
sectional realized ¯, ¯¡ and ¯+ of each quintile portfolio. These realized factor loadings are
26computed over the following 12 months. The last column of Table 8 shows the cross-sectional
realized coskewness of each quintile portfolios, also computed over the next 12 months.14
Panel A reports a monotonically increasing pattern in the realized downside betas of stocks
sorted on past downside betas. That is, stocks with low (high) ¯¡ in the past continue to have
low (high) ¯¡ going forward. The difference in the realized ¯¡ between portfolios 5 and 1
sorted on past ¯¡ is 0.80. Hence, past ¯¡ seems to predict future ¯¡, but this range is far less
than the range of ¯¡ loadings for portfolios sorted on realized downside beta. In contrast, Table
1 shows that the range of realized ¯¡ loadings of quintile portfolios sorted on realized ¯¡ is
much wider at 1.72. Although past downside beta is persistent, it is far from a perfect predictor
of future downside risk exposure. This is also illustrated by the 12-month autocorrelation of ¯¡
among stocks listed on the NYSE, which is only 0.43. The difference in realized ¯, at 0.77,
across the quintile portfolios sorted by past ¯¡ is similar to the 0.80 difference in realized ¯¡.
Panel A also shows that the past variation of ¯¡ produces little variation in realized coskewness.
Hence, the past ¯¡ sorts are not reﬂecting coskewness risk.
While the ex-post ¯¡ loadings maintain their monotonic pattern, Panel A disappointingly
shows a very weak relationship between past ¯¡ and future returns. We do observe a strictly
increasing pattern moving from the ﬁrst quintile ¯¡ portfolio to the fourth quintile ¯¡ portfolio
from 0.59% to 0.84% per month. This difference is statistically signiﬁcant with a t-statistic of
2.06. However, the highest ¯¡ quintile portfolio has a low average excess return of 0.70% per
month. Thus, the predictive relation is not as strong among stocks with the highest past ¯¡.
In contrast, Panel B of Table 8 shows the relation between past coskewness, future returns,
and future risk attributes. The portfolios of stocks sorted by past coskewness do not exhibit
large ex-post variation in coskewness. The average pre-ranking spread in coskewness between
portfolios 5 and 1 is 0.50, while the average post-ranking spread in realized coskewness is only
0.05. Nevertheless, we observe a strong, strictly decreasing pattern in the returns of stocks
sorted by past coskewness. The portfolio of the most negative coskewness stocks (quintile 1)
has an average excess return of 0.84% per month, whereas the portfolio of the least negative
coskewness stocks (quintile 5) has an average excess return of 0.57% per month. This pattern is
consistent with Harvey and Siddique (2000a). The strong predictive pattern of past coskewness
and future returns does not have a relationship with downside beta as the future ¯¡ loadings
from past coskewness are almost ﬂat. Hence, the predictive pattern for cross-sectional returns
from past coskewness is not picking up downside risk.
14 We ﬁnd that past ¯+ has no predictive ability for future returns, even after excluding the most volatile stocks
as in Section 4.3. This is consistent with the results in Section 3, which fails to ﬁnd a consistent contemporaneous
pattern in expected returns for realized ¯+ risk. There results are available upon request.
274.3 Investable Portfolio With a Spread in Downside Risk
The Fama-MacBeth regressions in Table 7 suggest that a simple trading strategy of forming
portfolios on past ¯¡ to predict future exposure to downside risk can be reﬁned by considering
subsets of portfolios focusing on volatility, book-to-market and momentum interactions with
downsiderisk. Inthissection, weconsideronepossiblereﬁnementofpredictingfuture¯¡ using
past ¯¡, which the Fama-MacBeth regressions of the determinants of ¯¡ in Table 7 suggest is
an important confounding inﬂuence. Speciﬁcally, we examine the role of stock return volatility
and ¯¡, and show that only for stocks with the highest volatility levels does past high ¯¡ fail to
predict future high average returns.
There are two reasons why high stock volatility causes past ¯¡ to be a poor predictor
of future ¯¡. First, in order for the strong contemporaneous pattern between ¯¡ loadings
and average returns to be exploited in an investable portfolio strategy, we must accurately
forecast future ¯¡ exposure. When return volatility is very high, the past ¯¡ estimates contain
substantial measurement error. Thus, high volatility causes the persistence of ¯¡ to be lower,
and thus future ¯¡ loadings to be less predictable, because of sampling error.
Second, Ang et al. (2005) identify a puzzling anomaly that stocks with very high total or
idiosyncratic volatility have extremely low returns. We suspect that this effect confounds the
relationship between high ¯¡ and high return. High volatility stocks also tend to be high beta
stocks because, holding correlation between the market and the stock return constant, a high
individual stock volatility implies a high ¯. To clearly see the confounding interaction between


















var(rmjrm < ¹m) represent stock and market volatilities conditional on down markets,
respectively. High downside beta can be produced by high downside correlation, ½¡, or by high
downside volatility, ¾
¡
i . But, holding constant ½¡, stocks with high volatility, or ¾
¡
i , tend to
have low returns, which is exactly opposite to the high ¯¡, high average return effect that we
wish to observe.15 Therefore the Ang et al. (2005) volatility effect works in the opposite way
as the expected return pattern for ¯¡, making it hard to predict downside risk for stocks with
very high volatility.
15 In contrast, when ¾
¡
i is held constant, increasing downside correlation can only increase ¯¡. Hence, we tend
to see high average future returns for stocks with high past downside correlation. Ang, Chen and Xing (2002)
report that the difference in average future returns over the next month between the tenth and ﬁrst decile portfolios
sorted on past ½¡ is approximately 5% per annum.
28Table 9 shows that past ¯¡ poorly predicts future ¯¡ only for high volatility stocks. In Panel
A, we report selected summary statistics of portfolios sorted by volatility, measured using daily
continuously compounded returns over the previous 12 months. For the overall sample and
for each of the highest volatility groups, we report the average market capitalization, past ¯¡,
and average returns adjusted for size and book-to-market using a characteristic control similar
to Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997). While the average stock has an annualized
volatility of 36%, stocks in the highest volatility quintile have a considerably higher average
volatility of 61% per annum. Stocks in the highest demi-decile (5%-tile) have an average
volatility of over 85% per annum.
The second row of Panel A reports that the quintile of stocks with the highest volatility
constitutes, on average, only 3.9% of the overall market capitalization. Hence, by excluding the
highest quintile of volatile stocks, we exclude stocks that represent only a small fraction of the
market. In fact, the highest demi-decile (5%-tile) of the most volatile stocks constitutes only
0.4% of the total market capitalization. Hence, not surprisingly, the highest volatility stocks
tend to be small. In the third row, we report the size and book-to-market adjusted returns.16
Stocks in the highest volatility quintile (demi-decile) underperform their benchmark portfolios
by, on average, a large 0.38% (0.67%) per month. This is the puzzling Ang et al. (2005) effect
– stocks with very high total or idiosyncratic volatility have low average returns.
The last two rows of Panel A explore the interaction between volatility and ¯¡. While an
average stock has a past ¯¡ loading of almost one (0.99), high volatility stocks tend to have
high past ¯¡. In particular, the average past ¯¡ is 1.44 for the stocks in the highest volatility
quintile. We compare this with stocks in the highest realized ¯¡ quintile of Table 1, which have
an average ¯¡ of 1.92. Thus, on the one hand, stocks with high volatility tend to have high ¯¡.
On the other hand, high ¯¡ stocks are not completely stocks with high volatilities.
Moreover, the fact that high volatility stocks have high past ¯¡ loadings does not imply that
they continue to exhibit high ¯¡ loadings in the following period. For stocks in the highest
volatility quintile, the average ¯¡ loading over the next 12 months is only 1.25, compared to the
¯¡ over the past 12 months of 1.44. This accounts for the fairly low persistence of the 12-month
downside betas of 26%, compared to the average 12-month ¯¡ autocorrelation of 43.5%. If we
narrow our focus to stocks on the highest volatility octile, decile or demi-decile, we ﬁnd that
these stocks exhibit even lower persistence of ¯¡ across the formation period and future holding
periods. We conjecture that this lower correspondence of past ¯¡ to future ¯¡ arises, in part,
from the fact that high volatility increases the sampling error of the past ¯¡ as a predictor of
16 Since we use all stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ in constructing size and book-to-market
benchmark portfolios, the average adjusted returns of all stocks listed on the NYSE does not sum up to 0.0%.
29future downside risk. Large measurement error makes the pre-formation ¯¡ loadings a more
unreliable predictor of actual, post-formation, downside betas. If we focus on stocks with lower
volatility, our past ¯¡ loadings are more accurate ex-ante predictors of future ex-post downside
risk loadings.
In PanelB of Table9, we examinethe average return patterns to ranking on past ¯¡ when we
exclude the most volatile stocks. Fortunately, Panel A shows that the segment of stocks where
past ¯¡ provides a poor predictor of future ¯¡ constitutes only a small fraction of total market
capitalization (less than 4%). We ﬁrst sort stocks based on their past total volatility over the past
year. Then, we exclude stocks in the highest volatility quintile and sort the remaining stocks
into quintiles according to past ¯¡. We report the difference in average (unadjusted) returns
between the highest quintile and the lowest quintile ¯¡ portfolios, as well as the difference in
returns between the second highest and the lowest quintile portfolios. Panel B shows that by
excludingstocksinthehighestvolatilityquintile, theaveragedifferencebetweenthehighestand
the lowest quintile ¯¡ portfolios of 0.34% per month is statistically signiﬁcant with a t-statistic
of 2.31. The difference between the second highest and the lowest quintile ¯¡ portfolios is
slightly smaller at 0.25% per month, but has approximately the same statistical signiﬁcance.17
4.4 Robustness Checks
In Table 10, we check that the predictive relation between past ¯¡ and future returns, excluding
themost volatilestocks, is notdue tosize, book-to-market, momentum, coskewness, orliquidity
effects. TheﬁrstcolumnofTable10showstheaveragesizeandbook-to-marketadjustedreturns
of portfolios sorted by past ¯¡. We observe a monotonically increasing relation between past
¯¡ and next month returns. Controlling for size and book-to-market increases the average
difference in returns between the lowest and highest ¯¡ quintile to 0.44% per month from
0.34% per month in Panel B of Table 9. This difference is highly statistically signiﬁcant, with a
t-statistic of 3.36.
In the next three columns, we control for additional past return characteristics: momentum,
coskewness, and liquidity. For each additional control, we ﬁrst perform a quintile sort based
on the characteristic and then on past ¯¡ excluding the highest volatility quintile of stocks.
17 If we exclude fewer stocks and only exclude stocks in the highest volatility octile or decile, the return
difference between highest ¯¡ portfolio and the lowest ¯¡ portfolio is about the same order of magnitude
(roughly 0.31% per month), but the statistical signiﬁcance is somewhat weaker, with p-values of 0.051 and 0.063,
respectively. However, the return difference between quintiles 1 and 4 is unaffected for all the volatility exclusions
at 0.25% per month and is always statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This is due to the fact that the volatility
effect is strongest among high volatility stocks which tend to have the highest past ¯¡.
30Then, we average the ¯¡ quintiles across the characteristic quintiles, and report size and book-
to-market matched returns within each ¯¡ quintile. To control for momentum, we use past
12-month returns. Liquidity is measured using the historical liquidity betas of P´ astor and
Stambaugh (2003). Table 10 clearly shows that the spreads in size and book-to-market adjusted
returns between the ¯¡ quintiles 1 and 5 remains signiﬁcant at the 5% level after controlling
for momentum, coskewness, and liquidity. In each case, the point estimates of the differences
average over 0.30% per month. Therefore, our predictive pattern of returns for past ¯¡ are not
due to size, book-to-market, past return, coskewness, or liquidity effects.
Finally, as an alternative control for volatility, we consider orthogonalizing the ¯¡ portfolios
with respect to volatility in Table 11. We ﬁrst rank stocks according to past twelve month
volatility into quintiles. Then, we perform a second ranking within each volatility quintile
into quintiles according to ¯¡ over the past 12 months. We then form equal-weighted portfolios
within each doubly-sorted group, hold the portfolio over the next one month, and report average
size and book-to-market adjusted returns.
Table 11 shows a strong positive relation between past downside beta and the next one-
month size and book-to-market adjusted return within each volatility quintile. In fact, the
differences between the highest and the lowest downside beta quintile returns are signiﬁcant
in all quintiles, except in the highest volatility quintile. When we average the returns of ¯¡
portfolios across volatility quintiles (in the last column), we ﬁnd that there is a statistically
signiﬁcant difference in returns of 0.31% per month across the highest quintile downside beta
stocks and the lowest quintile downside beta stocks. Hence, controlling for volatility, there is a
strong predictive relation between past ¯¡ and future returns.
In summary, although there is a strong contemporaneous relation between downside risk and
average returns, this relation does not hold predictively for stocks with very high volatility. For
the vast majority of stocks, we can use past downside beta to predict future returns. For stocks
with high volatility, factor loadings contain large measurement error, making past downside
beta a less reliable predictor of future downside risk, and Ang et al. (2005) report that stocks
with high volatility have low returns. Fortunately, these very volatile stocks constitute a small
fraction of the total market capitalizations of only 4%. If we focus on stocks not in the highest
volatility quintile, we ﬁnd a strong pattern between past ¯¡ and future holding period returns.
However, by not examining the predictive ability of downside risk among stocks with very high
volatility, we completely abstract from the puzzling Ang et al. (2005) volatility effect which we
cannot resolve in this paper.
315 Conclusion
The cross-section of stock returns reﬂects a premium for downside risk. Stocks that covary
strongly with the market, conditional on market declines, have high average returns. This risk-
return relation is consistent with an economy where agents place greater weight on downside
riskthantheyplaceonupsidegains. Agentswithaversiontodownsideriskrequireapremiumto
hold assets that have high sensitivities to market downturns. Hence, stocks with high downside
risk exposure, or high downside betas, have high average returns.
We ﬁnd that the contemporaneous high average returns earned by stocks with high downside
betas are not explained by a list of cross-sectional effects, including size and book-to-market
effects, coskewness risk, liquidity risk, and the momentum effect. The downside risk premium
effect is also different from the premium on regular market beta. Controlling for these and other
cross-sectional effects, we estimate that the cross-sectional premium for bearing downside beta
risk is approximately 6% per annum. The downside premium is robust across a battery of
robustness tests. In particular, we ﬁnd that the premium captured by downside beta is quite
different from the coskewness effect of Harvey and Siddique (2000a). Downside beta measures
riskconditionalonlyonmarketdeclines, whereascoskewnesscapturesthecovariationofastock
with extreme downside movements of the market. In contrast, we ﬁnd that the premium for
upside risk is weak in the data and often changes signs depending on the set of cross-sectional
risk controls.
Past downside beta is a good predictor of future covariation with down market movements,
except for stocks that are extremely volatile. For the vast majority of stocks, past downside
beta cross-sectionally predicts future returns. However, for stocks with very high volatility,
consisting of less than 4% of market capitalization, past downside beta provides a poor predictor
of future downside risk. While high volatility stocks constitute only a small fraction of the
total market, so a predictive downside beta relationship holds for the vast majority of stocks, it
remains to be explored why the cross-sectional predictive relation for downside risk does not
hold for stocks with very high levels of volatility.
32Appendix
A Solution of the Disappointment Aversion Asset Allocation
Problem
Ang, Bekaert and Liu (2005) develop an algorithm for solving the portfolio allocation problem for DA utility
that transforms the DA asset allocation problem in equation (3) into a series of standard CRRA problems under
a transformed measure that involves the degree of disappointment aversion A. The simplicity of their algorithm
relies crucially on the assumption of a discretized state space that is ordered by wealth. However, their set-up
is only for a single risky asset. We extend their algorithm to a multiple asset case, by considering all possible
combinations of the six states. This appendix outlines this numerical solution.



























where 1f¢g is an indicator function.
Over a discrete-state space over states (xs;ys) indexed by s, the deﬁnition of the certainty equivalent ¹W in


















where wealth in state s is given by:
Ws = Rf + wxxs + wyys;

































5 = 0: (A-3)
Ang, Bekaert and Liu (2005) note that equation (A-3) is a standard CRRA maximization problem with a
changed probability measure, where the probabilities for wealth above the certainty equivalent are down-weighted.
That is, deﬁning the probabilities as:
¼i ´
(p1;:::;pi;Api+1;:::;ApN)0
(p1 + ::: + pi) + A(pi+1 + ::: + pN)
; (A-4)








s ys = 0: (A-5)
The algorithm starts with a state i, solves the standard CRRA problem with probability distribution f¼ig for
the optimal portfolio weights w¤
xi and w¤












33We must ﬁnd the state i where:
¹¤
Wi 2 [Rf + w¤
xixi + w¤
yiyi; Rf + w¤
xixi+1 + w¤
yiyi+1): (A-6)
If this condition holds, then the optimal portfolio weights for x and y, w¤
x and w¤





yi and the optimal utility is given by ¹¤
W = ¹¤
Wi.
The condition (A-6) relies on ordering the states in increasing wealth. To modify this algorithm, we take all
possible M orderings of the states. Then, we ﬁnd state i of ordering j where (A-6) is satisﬁed. This gives the
solution to the DA asset allocation problem over the two assets x and y.
For our calibrations, we set ° = 6, A = 0:8 and set the gross-risk free rate to be Rf = 1:05. For a baseline
case, we take ux = 0:25 + ¹, mx = 0:16 + ¹, dx = ¡0:25 + ¹, uy = 0:40 and dy = ¡0:15. The 6 states have
probabilities given by p1 = 0:15, p2 = 0:20, p3 = 0:15, p4 = 0:25 and p5 = 0:20. In equilibrium, the value
of ¹ = 0:0021. This gives us equilibrium weights of w¤
x = 0:5543 and w¤
y = 0:4457, which sums to 1, which
represents the market. In this speciﬁcation, the mean excess returns, standard deviations and betas of the two assets
and the market are given by:
mean stdev ¯
x 0.1168 0.1863 0.6944
y 0.1250 0.2750 1.3800
mkt 0.1200 0.1375 1.0000
To obtain the relations between the ¯, downside beta ¯¡ and coskewness and alphas, we alter xd from ¡0:16 to
¡0:30. Figure 1 shows the risk-return relations for asset x.
With an alternative set of parameters, CAPM alphas increase with increasing ¯¡ but also increasing co-
skewness. For this case, ° = 6, A = 0:7, Rf = 1:05, xu = 0:50+¹, xm = 0:20+¹, xd = ¡0:30+¹, yu = 0:35
and yd = ¡0:7. The probabilities are given by p1 = 0:10, p2 = 0:20, p3 = 0:20, p4 = 0:20 and p5 = 0:20. If p1
is altered between 0.08 and 0.10 and ¹ solved for each case to obtain equilibrium, then we have:
CAPM ® ¯ ¯¡ co-skew
0.0273 0.9567 2.9883 -0.1417
0.0317 0.8473 3.1752 -0.1087
0.0348 0.7326 3.3873 -0.0598
However, this case is unrealistic because the values of the ¯¡s are extremely high.
B Data and Portfolio Construction
We use data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to construct portfolios of stocks sorted by
various characteristics of returns. We conﬁne our attention to ordinary common stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX
and NASDAQ, omitting ADRs, REITs, closed-end funds, foreign ﬁrms and other securities which do not have a
CRSP share type code of 10 or 11. We use daily and monthly returns from CRSP for the period covering July 3rd,
1962 to December 31st, 2001, including NASDAQ data which is only available after 1972. We use the one-month
Treasury bill rate from Ibbotson Associates the risk-free rate and take CRSP’s value-weighted returns of all stocks
as the market portfolio. All our returns are expressed as continuously compounded returns. We also use book value
information found on COMPUSTAT.
For every 12-month period, we construct portfolios based on measures of risk between asset i’s excess return,
rit, and the market’s excess return, rmt. We exclude stocks with more than ﬁve missing observations from our
analysis. We ﬁrst demean returns within each period, and denote ~ rit as the demeaned excess return of asset i
and ~ rmt as the demeaned market excess return. We obtain estimates of the regular market ¯, denoted ^ ¯, and the
individual stock volatility ¾, denoted ^ ¾, in the usual manner as:
^ ¯ =
P
~ rit~ rmt P
~ r2
mt







where T is the number of trading days in a period. We estimate downside beta and upside beta by conditioning the




demeaned excess return of asset i and demeaned market excess returns conditional on market excess return being
below the sample means, denoted ~ r
¡
it and ~ r
¡
mt, respectively. We also calculate demeaned excess return of asset i
34and demeaned market excess returns conditional on market excess return being above the sample means, denoted
~ r
+
it and ~ r
+
mt, respectively. We then calculate ^ ¯¡ and ^ ¯+ as:
^ ¯¡ =
P
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We calculate higher-order moments of stock returns using continuously compounded daily returns over each


































We also collect market capitalizations, book-to-market ratio, and past 12-month returns at the beginning of each
12-month period for each stock.
To calculate the liquidity betas for individual stocks, at the end of each month, we identify stocks listed on
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ with at least ﬁve years of monthly returns. For each stock, we estimate a liquidity
beta, ¯L
i , by running the following regression using the most recent ﬁve years of monthly data:
ri;t = ¯0
i + ¯L
i Lt + ¯M
i rm;t + ¯S
i SMBt + ¯H
i HMLt + ²i;t; (B-10)
where Lt is the innovation in aggregate liquidity and SMBt and HMLt are size and book-to-market factors of
Fama and French (1993). The details of the construction of Lt is in P´ astor and Stambaugh (2003).
Once portfolios are formed, we calculate the returns to holding these portfolios. Over each 12-month period,
we collect the cumulative returns of each stock in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate over the period. We
also collect the excess stock return over the next month, as well as stock returns in excess of size and book-to-
market matched benchmark portfolios. These size and book-to-market adjusted returns are calculated in a manner
similar to Daniel et al. (1997). Each month, stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ are sorted into quintiles
according to their beginning of period market capitalizations based on NYSE breakpoints. Then within each of
these quintiles, stocks are further sorted into quintiles according to their book-to-market ratios based on NYSE
breakpoints. For each 5 £ 5 grouping, we calculate the return on an equal-weighted portfolio consisting of all
stocks that fall into that grouping. For each stock, size and book-to-market adjusted returns are deﬁned as the
return in excess of the portfolio return of the 5 £ 5 grouping to which the stock belongs. All of these returns are
calculated with an adjustment for delisting by taking the delisting return at the time the stock is delisted. If a return
is missing, we take the next available return.
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38Table 1: Returns of Stocks Sorted by Realized Factor Loadings
Panel A: Stocks Sorted by Realized ¯ Panel B: Stocks Sorted by Realized ¯¡
Portfolio Return ¯ ¯¡ ¯+ Portfolio Return ¯ ¯¡ ¯+
1 Low ¯ 3.52% 0.28 0.36 0.19 1 Low ¯¡ 2.71% 0.40 0.19 0.42
2 6.07% 0.59 0.67 0.51 2 5.62% 0.63 0.61 0.62
3 7.58% 0.82 0.90 0.77 3 7.63% 0.83 0.89 0.79
4 9.48% 1.10 1.18 1.06 4 10.16% 1.06 1.23 0.99
5 High ¯ 13.95% 1.64 1.72 1.63 5 High ¯¡ 14.49% 1.49 1.92 1.34
High-Low 10.43% 1.36 1.36 1.44 High-Low 11.78% 1.09 1.72 0.92
t-stat [4.98] t-stat [6.16]
Panel C: Stocks Sorted by Realized Relative ¯¡ Panel D: Stocks Sorted by Realized ¯+
Portfolio Return ¯ ¯¡ ¯+ Portfolio Return ¯ ¯¡ ¯+
1 Low Relative ¯¡ 4.09% 0.98 0.56 1.12 1 Low ¯+ 5.73% 0.44 0.63 -0.04
2 7.69% 0.83 0.73 0.84 2 7.42% 0.62 0.73 0.45
3 8.53% 0.80 0.86 0.75 3 8.29% 0.82 0.90 0.76
4 9.56% 0.84 1.08 0.72 4 9.33% 1.05 1.10 1.12
5 High Relative ¯¡ 10.73% 0.98 1.60 0.71 5 High ¯+ 9.83% 1.49 1.46 1.85
High-Low 6.64% 0.00 1.04 -0.41 High-Low 4.11% 1.05 0.83 1.89
t-stat [7.70] t-stat [2.62]
Panel E: Stocks Sorted by Realized Relative ¯+ Panel F: Stocks Sorted by Realized ¯+ ¡ ¯¡
Portfolio Return ¯ ¯¡ ¯+ Portfolio Return ¯ ¯¡ ¯+
1 Low Relative ¯+ 10.48% 0.91 1.19 0.25 1 Low ¯+ ¡ ¯¡ 11.35% 0.94 1.45 0.37
2 9.51% 0.82 0.95 0.58 2 9.83% 0.83 1.03 0.62
3 8.53% 0.81 0.88 0.76 3 8.53% 0.80 0.87 0.75
4 7.72% 0.85 0.87 0.99 4 7.35% 0.84 0.78 0.95
5 High Relative ¯+ 4.37% 1.03 0.95 1.56 5 High ¯+ ¡ ¯¡ 3.55% 1.02 0.70 1.46
High-Low -6.11% 0.12 -0.23 1.31 High-Low -7.81% 0.08 -0.75 1.08
t-stat [9.02] t-stat [9.03]
This table lists the equal-weighted average returns and risk characteristics of stocks sorted by realized betas.
For each month, we calculate ¯, ¯¡, ¯+, relative ¯¡ (given by ¯¡ ¡¯), relative ¯+ (given by ¯+ ¡¯), and
¯+ ¡ ¯¡ with respect to the market of all stocks listed on the NYSE using daily continuously compounded
returns over the next 12 months. For each risk characteristic, we rank stocks into quintiles (1–5) and form
equal-weighted portfolios at the beginning of each 12 month period. The number of stocks in each portfolio
varies across time from 216 to 317 stocks. The column labelled “Return” reports the average return in
excess of the one-month T-bill rate over the next 12 months (which is the same period as the period used
to compute ¯, ¯¡ and ¯+). The row labelled “High-Low” reports the difference between the returns of
portfolio 5 and portfolio 1. The entry labelled “t-stat” in square brackets is the t-statistic computed using
Newey-West (1987a) heteroskedastic-robust standard errors with 12 lags. The columns labelled “¯”, “¯¡”
and “¯+” report the time-series and cross-sectional average of equal-weighted individual stock betas over the
12-month holding period. The sample period is from July 1963 to December 2001, with the last 12-month
period from January 2001 to December 2001, and observations are at a monthly frequency.
39Table 2: Fama-MacBeth Regressions
Mean
Model I II III IV V VI (Std Dev)
Intercept 0.300 0.044 0.054 0.046 0.246 0.257
[9.35] [3.39] [1.66] [1.42] [7.62] [7.79]
¯ 0.177 0.828
[8.19] (0.550)
¯¡ 0.069 0.064 0.028 0.062 0.056 0.882
[7.17] [7.44] [2.68] [6.00] [5.25] (0.739)
¯+ -0.029 -0.025 0.003 0.020 0.017 0.722
[4.85] [4.15] [0.22] [2.33] [1.91] (0.842)
Log-Size -0.039 -0.007 -0.013 -0.034 -0.034 5.614
[8.82] [1.47] [3.03] [7.77] [7.39] (1.523)
Bk-Mkt 0.017 0.024 0.023 0.017 0.018 0.768
[3.87] [5.17] [5.03] [3.67] [3.76] (0.700)
Past Ret 0.017 0.063 0.053 0.020 0.015 0.085
[1.91] [6.32] [5.40] [2.12] [1.50] (0.370)
Std Dev -8.433 -5.781 -6.459 0.355
[10.7] [6.41] [7.04] (0.174)
Coskewness -0.229 -0.181 -0.196 -0.188 -0.179
[10.7] [4.31] [5.07] [4.59] (0.188)
Cokurtosis 0.015 0.045 0.047 2.240
[1.57] [4.40] [4.52] (1.353)
¯L -0.008 -0.166
[0.93] (0.456)
This table shows the results of Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions of 12-month excess returns on ﬁrm
characteristics and realized risk characteristics. The sample period is from July 1963 to December 2001, with
the last 12-month period from January 2001 to December 2001, and observations are at a monthly frequency
(451 months) for all stocks listed on the NYSE. For Regression VI, the sample period is from January 1967 to
December 2001 (397 months). The number of stocks in each regression varies across time from 1080 to 1582
stocks. The t-statistics in square brackets are computed using Newey-West (1987a) heteroskedastic-robust
standard errors with 12 lags. The ﬁrm characteristics are log of market capitalizations (“Log-Size”), book-
to-market ratios (“Bk-Mkt”), and past 12-month excess returns (“Past Ret”), all computed at the beginning
of each period. The realized risk characteristics are ¯, ¯¡, ¯+, standard deviations (“Std Dev”), coskewness
and cokurtosis are all calculated over the following 12-month period using daily continuously compounded
returns. We also include the P´ astor-Stambaugh (2003) liquidity beta, ¯L, for January 1967 to January 2001.
All independent variables are Winsorized at the 1% level and at the 99% within each month. We report
time-series averages of the cross-sectional mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of each independent
variable in the last column.
40Table 3: Returns of Stocks Sorted by Realized Downside Beta and Coskewness
Panel A: ¯¡ Sorts Controlling for Coskewness
Coskewness Quintiles
Portfolio 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High Average
1 Low ¯¡ 7.21% 5.74% 4.03% 3.40% 0.22% 4.21%
2 10.55% 8.40% 6.94% 5.59% 2.61% 6.82%
3 13.63% 11.30% 8.30% 6.08% 3.76% 8.61%
4 15.63% 12.82% 9.35% 6.74% 2.56% 9.42%
5 High ¯¡ 21.84% 15.85% 11.51% 6.81% 2.32% 11.67%
High-Low 14.64% 10.11% 7.48% 3.41% 2.10% 7.55%
t-stat [5.62] [5.22] [3.91] [1.87] [1.32] [4.16]
Panel B: Coskewness Sorts Controlling for ¯¡
¯¡ Quintiles
Portfolio 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High Average
1 Low Coskew 4.69% 7.15% 9.30% 12.59% 17.61% 10.27%
2 4.17% 6.19% 9.61% 12.33% 18.21% 10.10%
3 2.74% 6.51% 8.68% 11.31% 16.07% 9.06%
4 1.50% 5.24% 6.68% 9.16% 12.83% 7.08%
5 High Coskew 0.41% 2.96% 3.86% 5.37% 7.65% 4.05%
High-Low -4.28% -4.18% -5.45% -7.22% -9.96% -6.22%
t-stat [4.23] [5.64] [7.12] [8.09] [7.94] [8.17]
This table examines the relation between ¯¡ and coskewness. For each month, we compute ¯¡ and
coskewness with respect to the market of all stocks listed on the NYSE using daily continuously compounded
returns over the next 12 months. In Panel A, we ﬁrst rank stocks into quintiles (1–5) at the beginning of each
12 month period based on coskewness over the next 12 months. Then, we rank stocks within each ﬁrst-sort
quintile into additional quintiles according to ¯¡ computed over the next 12 months. For each 5£5 grouping,
we form an equal-weighted portfolio. In Panel B, we reverse the order so that we ﬁrst sort on ¯¡ and then
on coskewness. The sample period is from July 1963 to December 2001 and the number of stocks in each
portfolio varies across time from 43 to 64 stocks. We report the average return in excess of the one-month
T-bill rate over the next 12 months. For the column labelled “Average,” we report the average return of stocks
in each second sort quintile. This controls for coskewness (¯¡) in Panel A (B). The row labelled “High-Low”
reports the difference between the returns of portfolio 5 and portfolio 1. The entry labelled “t-stat” in square
brackets is the t-statistic computed using Newey-West (1987a) heteroskedastic-robust standard errors with 12
lags.










¯ 1.000 0.779 0.770 0.762 0.760 0.769 0.776
¯¡ 1.000 0.971 0.967 0.464 0.444 0.439
¯
¡
rf 1.000 0.990 0.447 0.467 0.452
¯
¡
0 1.000 0.447 0.461 0.464







This table reports the time-series averages of cross-sectional correlations of various risk characteristics for
stocks listed on the NYSE. The risk characteristics are regular beta (¯), downside beta (¯¡), downside beta
deﬁned relative to the risk-free rate (¯
¡
rf), downside beta deﬁned relative to a zero return (¯
¡
0 ), upside beta
(¯+), upside beta relative to the risk-free rate (¯
+
rf), and upside beta relative to a zero return (¯
¡
0 ). The regular
downside and upside beta, ¯¡ and ¯+, respectively, are calculated relative to the sample mean market return.
All risk characteristics are computed using daily returns over the past 12 months. The sample period is from
July 1963 to December 2001, with the last 12-month period from January 2001 to December 2001. There are
a total of 451 observations at a monthly frequency.
42Table 5: Robustness Checks of Realized Downside Beta Portfolios
Exclude Two-Year Value- All Non-
Portfolio Small Weekly Weighted Stocks Overlapping
Panel A: Sorts by Realized ¯¡
1 Low 4.48% 7.08% 2.62% 4.14% 3.69%
2 6.25% 12.54% 4.23% 7.23% 5.74%
3 7.69% 16.86% 6.04% 8.84% 8.33%
4 10.33% 21.34% 9.32% 11.35% 10.68%
5 High 12.81% 29.35% 9.76% 19.37% 16.15%
High-Low 8.34% 22.27% 7.14% 15.24% 12.46%
t-stat [4.54] [4.96] [3.30] [5.57] [3.51]
Panel B: Sorts by Realized Relative ¯¡
1 Low 5.07% 11.46% 3.19% 5.58% 5.67%
2 8.01% 15.78% 6.86% 8.66% 8.78%
3 8.66% 18.06% 7.07% 9.41% 8.42%
4 9.44% 20.48% 7.56% 10.86% 9.67%
5 High 10.37% 21.37% 7.18% 14.21% 12.05%
High-Low 5.30% 9.91% 3.99% 8.63% 6.38%
t-stat [6.46] [4.29] [3.06] [7.02] [3.87]
We perform robustness checks of the results in Table 1. For each month, we calculate ¯¡ and relative ¯¡
using weekly (Wednesday to Tuesday) continuously compounded returns over each 24-month period or daily
continuously compounded returns over each 12-month period. We report the results using realized ¯¡ in
Panel A and the results using realized relative ¯¡ (given by ¯¡ ¡ ¯) in Panel B. For each risk characteristic,
we rank stocks into quintiles (1–5). In the ﬁrst column of each panel, we form equal-weighted portfolios
among NYSE stocks, but exclude stocks that fall in the lowest size quintile. In the second column, we form
equal-weighted portfolios among NYSE stocks formed by ranking on ¯¡ or (¯¡ ¡ ¯) computed using two
years of weekly data. In the third column of each panel, we form value-weighted portfolios using stocks
listed on the NYSE at the beginning of each 12-month period. In the fourth column, we use all stocks listed
on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ and form equal-weighted portfolios at the beginning of each period,
using quintile breakpoints based on NYSE stocks. In the last column, we compute the risk characteristics
using stocks listed on the NYSE and form equal-weighted portfolios at the beginning of each January using
non-overlapping 12-month horizon observations. We report the average return in excess of the one-month T-
bill rate over the next 12 months. The row labelled “High-Low” reports the difference between the returns of
portfolio 5 and portfolio 1. For the columns labelled “Exclude Small,” “Value-Weighted,” and “All Stocks,”
the sample period is from July 1963 to December 2001, with the last 12-month period from January 2001
to December 2001, with observations at a monthly frequency. For the column labelled “Two-Year Weekly,”
the sample period is from July 1963 to December 2001, with the last 24-month period spanning January
2000 to December 2001. For the column labelled “Non-Overlapping,” the sample period is from January
1964 to December 2001, with the last 12-month period lasting from January 2001 to December 2001. The
number of stocks in each portfolio varies across time from 216 to 317 stocks, except for “All Stocks,” where
it varies from 289 to 2330 stocks. The entry labelled “t-stat” in square brackets is the t-statistic computed
using Newey-West (1987a) heteroskedastic-robust standard errors with 24 lags for the second column, 1 lag
for the last column, and 12 lags for all other columns.
43Table 6: GMM Speciﬁcation Tests
Linear Factor Model Coefﬁcients





1.35 -17.73 22.84 H0: Spec I 3.85
[8.70] [3.03] [2.16] vs H1: Spec II (0.05)
Speciﬁcation III
1.08 -7.82 -0.95 -10.24
[34.5] [5.21] [0.50] [4.41]
Speciﬁcation IV
1.60 -26.97 35.73 -3.63 -11.09 H0: Spec III 9.49
[7.70] [3.42] [2.56] [1.52] [4.11] vs H1: Spec IV (0.00)
This table reports GMM estimates and GMM speciﬁcation tests using the 25 Fama and French (1993) size
and book-to-market sorted portfolios as base assets. Each linear factor model speciﬁcation takes the form of
equation (13), with speciﬁcations I-III being special cases of equation (13). In each case, we estimate the
coefﬁcients using the moment conditions (14). The column labeled “¢J” provides a Â2 difference test of a
restricted speciﬁcation (H0) versus an alternative speciﬁcation (H1). We report the Â2 statistic with p-values
below in parentheses. The sample period is from July 1963 to December 2001. In the table, robust t-statistics






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































45Note to Table 7
This table reports the results of Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions of realized relative downside risk (¯¡¡¯)
over a 12-month period on various ﬁrm characteristics and risk measures. The independent variables include
both past variables in the information set observable at time t (“Past Variables”) and also risk measures with
contemporaneous realization as the dependent variables (“Realized Risk Measures”). For all speciﬁcations
except Regression XIII, the sample period is from July 1963 to December 2001, with the last 12-month
period from January 2001 to December 2001, and observations are at a monthly frequency (451 months) for
all stocks listed on the NYSE. For Regression XIII, the sample period is from January 1967 to December 2001
(397 months). The t-statistics in square brackets are computed using Newey-West (1987a) heteroskedastic-
robust standard errors with 12 lags. All regressions include industry dummy variables using the industry
classiﬁcation codes of Ferson and Harvey (1991). The past variables include realized relative downside
risk beta (“Past Relative ¯¡”) and realized volatility (“Past Std Dev”) over the previous 12-month period.
The ﬁrm characteristics are log of market capitalization (“Log-Size”), the ﬁrm book-to-market ratio (“Bk-
Mkt”), and past 12-month excess returns (“Past Ret”), all computed at the beginning of each period. We
also include ﬁrm growth measured over the most recently available four-quarter period – return on equity
(“ROE”), the growth rate of assets (“Asset Growth”), and the growth rate of sales (“Sales Growth”) – as well
asbookleverage(“Leverage”), andanindicatorwhichequalsoneiftheﬁrmpaysdividends(“Ind[Div]”). The
realized risk characteristics measured contemporaneously as the realized relative downside beta dependent
variable are the standard deviation of excess returns (“Std Dev”), coskewness, and cokurtosis. All of the
realized characteristics are computed over the same 12-month period as the relative downside beta using
daily continuously compounded returns. We also include the realized P´ astor-Stambaugh (2003) liquidity
beta, ¯L, for January 1967 to January 2001. All independent variables are Winsorized at the 1% level and at
the 99% within each month.
46Table 8: Returns of Stocks Sorted by Past Asymmetry Measures
Realized Statistics
Average Next
Portfolio Month Return ¯ ¯¡ ¯+ Coskew
Panel A: Stocks Sorted by Past ¯¡
1 Low ¯¡ 0.59% 0.54 0.61 0.48 -0.13
2 0.71% 0.70 0.77 0.65 -0.15
3 0.77% 0.85 0.93 0.80 -0.17
4 0.84% 1.02 1.11 0.96 -0.18
5 High ¯¡ 0.70% 1.31 1.41 1.25 -0.18
High-Low 0.11% 0.77 0.80 0.77 -0.05
t-stat [0.60]
Panel B: Stocks Sorted by Past Coskewness
1 Low coskew 0.84% 0.91 1.01 0.85 -0.19
2 0.82% 0.90 0.99 0.84 -0.17
3 0.76% 0.89 0.97 0.83 -0.16
4 0.60% 0.87 0.95 0.82 -0.15
5 High coskew 0.57% 0.85 0.91 0.81 -0.13
High-Low -0.28% -0.06 -0.10 -0.04 0.05
t-stat [2.76]
This table reports the equal-weighted average returns and risk characteristics of stocks sorted by past ¯¡
(Panel A) and past coskewness (Panel B). For each month, we compute ¯¡ and coskewness with respect to
themarketofallstockslistedontheNYSEusingdailycontinuouslycompoundedreturnsovertheprevious12
months. For each risk characteristic, we rank stocks into quintiles (1–5) and form equal-weighted portfolios
at the beginning of each month. The sample period is from July 1962 to January 2001. The number of
stocks in each portfolio varies across time from 221 to 346 stocks. The column labelled “Average Next
Month Return” reports the average return in excess of the one-month T-bill rate over the next month. The
row labelled “High-Low” reports the difference between the returns of portfolio 5 and portfolio 1. The entry
labelled “t-stat” is the simple OLS t-statistic in square brackets. The columns labelled “¯”, “¯¡,” and “¯+”
report the time-series averages of equal-weighted cross-sectional averages of individual stock betas over the
next-12 month period. The column labelled “Coskew” reports the time-series averages of equal-weighted
cross-sectional averages of individual stock coskewness over the next 12-month period.
47Table 9: Stocks Sorted by Past ¯¡ Excluding the Most Volatile Stocks
Panel A: Selected Characteristics of Volatility Portfolios
Stocks of the Highest Volatility
All
Stocks Quintile Octile Decile 5%-tile
Proportion of Market Capitalization 100.0% 3.9% 1.9% 1.3% 0.4%
Annualized Volatility 35.9% 61.0% 68.4% 72.5% 85.6%
Size/Book-to-Market Adjusted Returns -0.08% -0.38% -0.50% -0.56% -0.67%
Past ¯¡ 0.99 1.44 1.47 1.48 1.44
12-month Autocorrelation of ¯¡ 43.5% 25.8% 21.8% 20.5% 17.3%
Panel B: Average Excess Returns
¯¡ Quintiles Excluding Most Volatile Stocks
1 Low 2 3 4 5 High High-Low Q4-Low
0.58% 0.69% 0.82% 0.82% 0.92% 0.34% 0.25%
[2.31] [2.28]
In Panel A, each month, we calculate individual stock volatility of all stocks listed on the NYSE using daily
continuously compounded returns over the previous 12 months. We sort stocks according to volatility into
quintiles, octiles, deciles, and demi-deciles (5%-tiles). Panel A reports selected average characteristics of
stocks in each volatility group. The ﬁrst column reports the characteristics over the entire sample. The
other columns report the characteristics within the highest volatility groups. The row labelled “Annualized
Volatility” reports the average stock volatility over the past 12 months, while the row labelled “Market Cap”
reports the time-series averages of cumulative market capitalization represented by the stocks in each group.
The other rows report the returns adjusted for size and book-to-market using a characteristic control similar
to Daniel et al. (1997), the past ¯¡ over the previous 12 months, and the autocorrelation of ¯¡ between
the past 12 months and the following 12 months. For each characteristic, we report the time-series averages
of equal-weighted cross-sectional averages. In Panel B, we report the average return in excess of the 1-
month T-bill rate over the next one month of portfolios sorted on past ¯¡ that exclude the highest volatility
quintile of stocks. Each month, we ﬁrst sort stocks into quintiles according to volatility measured using daily
continuously compounded returns over the previous 12 months. Then, we exclude the stocks that fall into the
highest volatility quintile and rank the remaining stocks into equal-weighted quintiles (1–5) according to past
¯¡ measured using continuously compounded returns over the previous 12 months. We report the average
excess return over the next month. The row labelled “ High-Low” (“Q4-Low”) reports the difference between
the returns of portfolio 5 (portfolio 4) and portfolio 1. We report simple t-statistics in square brackets. The
number of stocks in each portfolio varies across time and groupings from 177 to 346 stocks. The sample
period is from July 1962 to January 2001.
48Table 10: Characteristic Controls on Stocks Sorted by Past ¯¡
Including Additional Controls for
Size/Bk-Mkt
Adjusted Momentum Coskewness Liquidity
1 Low ¯¡ -0.25% -0.21% -0.21% -0.17%
2 -0.09% -0.07% -0.07% -0.02%
3 0.05% 0.04% 0.07% 0.05%
4 0.07% 0.10% 0.04% 0.10%
5 High ¯¡ 0.20% 0.12% 0.15% 0.13%
High-Low 0.44% 0.32% 0.36% 0.30%
t-stat [3.36] [2.71] [2.69] [2.15]
The table reports robustness checks of the results in Table 9. For each month, we compute individual stock
volatility and ¯¡ with respect to the market of all NYSE stocks using daily continuously compounded returns
over the previous 12 months. We ﬁrst sort stocks according to volatility into quintiles and exclude stocks that
fall within the highest volatility quintile. We rank the remaining stocks into quintiles (1–5) according to past
¯¡ and form equal-weighted portfolios at the beginning of each month. The table reports characteristic-
adjusted holding period returns over the next month of the ¯¡ quintiles that exclude stocks in the highest
volatility quintile. In column labelled “Size/Bk-Mkt Adjusted,” we report the average returns in excess of size
and book-to-market matched benchmark portfolios similar to Daniel et al. (1997). In the next three columns,
we include additional controls for momentum (as measured by past 12 month returns), past coskewness, and
past liquidity betas, computed following P´ astor and Stambaugh (2003). For each additional control, we ﬁrst
perform a quintile sort based on the characteristic and then on past ¯¡ excluding the highest volatility quintile
of stocks. Then, we average the ¯¡ quintiles across the characteristic quintiles, and report size and book-to-
market matched returns within each ¯¡ quintile. The number of stocks in each portfolio varies across time
from 177 to 277 stocks. The row labelled “High-Low” reports the difference between the returns of quintile
portfolios 1 and 5. The entry labelled “t-stat” in square brackets is the simple t-statistic. The sample period
is from July 1962 to January 2001, except in the last column where the sample period is from January 1967
to January 2001.
49Table 11: Returns of Stocks Sorted by Past Volatility and Past Realized Downside Beta
Past Volatility Quintiles
Portfolio 1 Low 2 3 4 5 High Average
1 Low ¯¡ -0.26% -0.07% -0.21% -0.27% -0.43% -0.25%
2 -0.23% 0.01% -0.01% 0.08% -0.37% -0.13%
3 -0.15% 0.07% 0.03% 0.00% -0.31% -0.07%
4 0.01% 0.11% 0.23% 0.17% -0.47% 0.01%
5 High ¯¡ 0.08% 0.17% 0.22% 0.14% -0.31% 0.06%
High-Low 0.35% 0.25% 0.43% 0.41% 0.12% 0.31%
t-stat [3.25] [2.35] [3.59] [2.84] [0.55] [3.14]
The table examines the relation between past realized volatility and past realized ¯¡. For each month, we
compute past volatility and past ¯¡ with respect to the market of all stocks listed on NYSE using daily
continuously compounded returns over the past 12 months. We ﬁrst rank stocks into quintiles (1–5) at the
beginning of each month based on volatility calculated over the previous 12 months. Then, we rank stocks
within each ﬁrst-sort quintile into additional quintiles according to realized ¯¡, computed over the previous
12 months. For each 5£5 grouping, we form an equal-weighted portfolio. In each cell, we report the average
returns in excess of size and book-to-market matched benchmark portfolios similar to Daniel et al. (1997).
In the column labelled “Average”, we report the average size and book-to-market adjusted return of stocks
in each second sort quintile, which controls for realized volatility. The row labelled “High-Low” reports the
difference between the returns of quintile portfolios 5 and portfolio 1. The entry labelled “t-stat” in square
brackets is the simple t-statistic. The sample period is from July 1963 to December 2001.
50Figure 1: Risk-Return Relations in a Disappointment Aversion Cross-Sectional Equilibrium




















Mean Excess Return vs Downside Beta




















CAPM Alpha vs Downside Beta





















CAPM Alpha vs Relative Downside Beta




















CAPM Alpha vs Coskewness





















CAPM Alpha vs Relative Upside Beta
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This ﬁgure shows risk-return relations for an asset in the DA cross-sectional equilibrium. In the top row we
have (i) a plot of the asset’s mean excess return versus downside beta ¯¡, and (ii) a plot of the asset’s CAPM
alpha versus downside beta ¯¡; in the second row, (iii) a plot of the asset’s CAPM alpha versus relative
downside beta, (¯¡ ¡ ¯), and (iv) a plot of the asset’s CAPM alpha versus coskewness; and in the bottom
row, (v) a plot of the asset’s CAPM alpha versus relative upside beta, (¯+ ¡ ¯), and (vi) a plot of the asset’s
CAPM alpha versus (¯+ ¡ ¯¡).
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